2015
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0894-y
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Evidence for anti-intellectualism about know-how from a sentence recognition task

Abstract: An emerging trend in cognitive science is to explore central epistemological questions using psychological methods. Early work in this growing area of research has revealed that epistemologists' theories of knowledge diverge in various ways from the ways in which ordinary people think of knowledge. Reflecting the practices of epistemology as a whole, the vast majority of these studies have focused on the concept of propositional knowledge, or knowledge-that. Many philosophers, however, have argued that knowing… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 26 publications
(42 reference statements)
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“…These results fit nicely with the idea, voiced by others too (Bengson et al 2009;Gonnerman et al 2018), that the ordinary concept of knowledge-how is at least partly intellectualist, since this position too predicts an effect of epistemic luck on ordinary ascriptions of knowledge-how. Finally, our findings speak against those who have argued that the folk are purely anti-intellectualists with respect to knowledge-how (Harmon and Horne 2016). 27…”
Section: Discussioncontrasting
confidence: 92%
“…These results fit nicely with the idea, voiced by others too (Bengson et al 2009;Gonnerman et al 2018), that the ordinary concept of knowledge-how is at least partly intellectualist, since this position too predicts an effect of epistemic luck on ordinary ascriptions of knowledge-how. Finally, our findings speak against those who have argued that the folk are purely anti-intellectualists with respect to knowledge-how (Harmon and Horne 2016). 27…”
Section: Discussioncontrasting
confidence: 92%
“…These results fit nicely with the idea, voiced by others too (Bengson, Moffett, & Wright 2009;Gonnerman, Mortensen, & Robbins 2018), that the ordinary concept of knowledge-how is at least partly intellectualist, since this position too predicts an effect of epistemic luck on ordinary ascriptions of knowledge-how. Finally, our findings speak against those who have argued that the folk are purely anti-intellectualists with respect to knowledge-how (Harmon & Horne 2016). 26…”
Section: Discussioncontrasting
confidence: 92%
“…By contrast, anti-intellectualists argue for a separation between propositional knowledge and knowledge-how (Habgood-Coote 2018). Anti-intellectualism is widely accepted by epistemologists (Stanley and Williamson 2001) and coheres with how people typically think about knowing (Harmon and Horne 2016). A body of research in cognitive science and neuropsychology supports the distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that (Adams 2009;Glick 2011;Wallis 2008).…”
Section: The Knowledge Argument In the Classroommentioning
confidence: 96%