2024
DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00098-1
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Evidence of direct and indirect reciprocity in network-structured economic games

Daniel Redhead,
Matthew Gervais,
Kotrina Kajokaite
et al.

Abstract: Formal theoretical models propose that cooperative networks can be maintained when individuals condition behavior on social standing. Here, we empirically examine the predictions of such models of positive and negative indirect reciprocity using a suite of network-structured economic games in four rural Colombian communities (Nind = 496 individuals, Nobs = 53,876 ratings/transfers). We observe that, at a dyadic-level, individuals have a strong tendency to exploit and punish others in bad standing (e.g., those … Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
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