Evidence, ontology, and psychological science: The lesson of hypnosis.

Abstract

Data are never free of philosophical encumbrances. Nevertheless, philosophical issues are often considered peripheral to method and evidence. Historical perspectives likewise are not considered integral to most data-driven disputes in contemporary psychological science. This paper examines the history of the investigation of hypnosis over the last 75 years to illuminate how evidence and method are entangled with epistemology and ontology, how new research directions are forged by changes in the cultural and philosophical landscape, and how unacknowledged philosophical assumptions can result in confusion and empirical cul-de-sacs. Theoretical disputes that appear to be simple empirical matters often entail hidden philosophical issues, and apparent historical continuity at the theoretical level can belie discontinuity at the ontological level. The lesson of hypnosis is that philosophical analysis is as important as methodological rigor.

Philosophical commitments, empirical evidence, and theoretical psychology

“…In contrast, Vandenberg (2010) invokes precisely the sort of split between philosophical commitments and empirical evidence to which we draw critical attention. He includes a discussion of construct validity as a prime example of the sorts of shifts in philosophical and theoretical commitment that affected the history of hypnosis research.…”

“…We begin with a fairly recent case in theoretical psychology, namely Vandenberg (2010). Vandenberg uses the history of hypnosis research as a case study to illustrate the role of philosophical commitments in psychology more generally.…”

“…Let us say, then, with Kuhn, and the theoretical psychologists whose work we’ve discussed, that major historical shifts in science are not always, or even typically a result of experimental evidence for a new theory, as against an older theory, but are instead the result of a shift in paradigmatic commitment, here defined as a shift in shared philosophical/theoretical commitments with a host of practical consequences, including what sorts of questions are worth asking, what sorts of data can count as evidence, and what sorts of results are recognized as errors (Kuhn, 1962/1996; Vandenberg, 2010, p. 51). As Vandenberg puts it: “Empirical [experimental] evidence is but one facet in the advancement of psychological science for, indeed, the very ground of what constitutes legitimate scientific evidence continues to shift” (p. 51).…”

“…We focus critical attention on instances in the theoretical psychology literature where the philosophical or theoretical commitments accompanying psychological research are characterized as worldviews, as nonempirical, and/or nonrational, as existing outside the bounds of methodological consideration (e.g., Sarason, 1984; Vandenberg, 2010; Wertheimer, 1986). We argue that this characterization is incoherent.…”

“…bounds of methodological consideration (e.g., Sarason, 1984;Vandenberg, 2010;Wertheimer, 1986). We argue that this characterization is incoherent.…”