Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies

Abstract

We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency's incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced. Keywords Merger remedies • Merger control • Antitrust JEL Classification L13 • L40 • K21"Overall [...] remedies have been used too often, too widely, too optimistically, and perhaps even strategically to the extent that they represent methods of avoiding challenging mergers but wishing to appear to be taking some action. This overuse of remedies [...] must be reversed in order to reverse the unfortunate evolution of merger policy into remedy policy. " -John Kwoka (2020: 99-100) For helpful comments and suggestions we thank the editor, Lawrence J. White, two anonymous referees, as well as Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Catarina Marvao, Monika Schnitzer, Christoph Schottmüller, Lars Sorgard, Deszö Szalay, and audiences at the EEA (Geneva), IIOC (Philadelphia), CRESSE conference (Rhodes), EARIE conference (Milan), BECCLE conference (Bergen), Verein für Socialpolitik annual conference (Münster), Industrial Economics committee meeting (Berlin),

«persona interesada» y el «tercero interesado» en el control de concentraciones económicas en Ecuador

“…156 Las condiciones constituyen derecho público no solo por su naturaleza y nalidades sino también porque en esencia terminan siendo una proyección del resto de lineamientos de derecho público del régimen de competencia previamente plasmados en la norma legal de la materia y que no busca otra cosa que la salvaguarda de la competencia como bien de interés general. 157 Los otros operadores económicos (terceros) son parte de este titular general, pero todas las condiciones se balancean en un equilibrio entre el bene cio al mercado y la carga para el operador obligado. 158 Las medidas tienen naturaleza de obligaciones jurídicas única y exclusivamente para el operador concentrado.…”