Evidentialism

Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought

“…evidence-Perspectivism is entailed by the combination of two claims widely held in epistemology: that epistemic justification is a kind of permission, and that it is a matter of having sufficient evidence. Versions of it are explicitly defended by Clifford (1866), Conee & Feldman (2004), and Gibbons (2013).…”

“…each turns 6. note also that perspectivists need not be 'internalists', in either of two familiar senses: they need not accept that what you may believe supervenes on your non-factive mental states, or that considerations bearing on what you may believe need be accessible by reflection (cf. Conee & Feldman 2004;Pryor 2001).…”

Epistemic Norms and the Limits of Epistemology

“…The first step to make is to come back to the idea that there are various kinds of hinges. Moyal-Sharrock (2004: 102) gives a useful classification: there are linguistic hinges ("Which colour is meant by the word blue"), personal hinges ("I come from such and such a city," "For months I have lived at address A"), local hinges ("There is an 13 See, e.g., Conee and Feldman (2004) on the generality problem for reliabilism. 14 One line of argument, which someone who rejects the idea that hinge propositions can be known propositionally will resist, consists, in the manner of Stanley and Williamson (2001), in arguing that knowledge how reduces to knowledge that.…”

Conceptual Evidentialism

“…The ‘wrong’ in this dictum is an all‐things‐considered wrong, not merely wrong by the epistemic standard. Recent defenders of evidentialism, such as Conee and Feldman (2004), stop far short of endorsing any such claim. CE, by contrast, seems to recapture the uncompromising spirit of the classical version, if anything even strengthening it.…”