Evidentialism, Explanationism, and Beliefs About the Future

McCain, Kevin

doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9470-3

Cited by 14 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…1. Psychologism about evidence comes also in the factive variety, identifying S ’s evidence with S ’s factive mental states or events. Neta (2002), Bergmann (2007), Turri (2009) and McCain (2014a and 2014b) also endorse Psychologism about evidence in one or another variety.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 96%

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Problems for Mainstream Evidentialism

Piazza

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Evidentialism says that a subject S’s justification is entirely determined by S’s evidence. The plausibility of evidentialism depends on (1) what kind of entities constitute a subject S’s evidence and (2) what one takes the support relation to consist in. Conee and Feldman’s mainstream evidentialism (ME) incorporates a psychologist answer to (1) and an explanationist answer to (2). ME naturally accommodates perceptual justification. However, it does not accommodate intuitive cases of inferential justification. In the second part of the paper, I consider and reject a reply based on a refined explanationist theory of the support relation proposed by K McCain.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…So unless there is a way in which ME can try to evade this consequence, ME must be rejected as lacking the needed generality. The following section is devoted to explore a possible way out of the above objection based on recent proposals by McCain (2014a, 2014b and 2015).…”

Section: Mainstream Evidentialism At Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Problems for Mainstream Evidentialism

Piazza

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…Kevin McCain (2014a) has responded to Byerly, as well as developed explanationism about evidential support in more detail (2013; 2014b). Byerly and Martin (forthcoming) reply to McCain (2014a). The main issues in the debate appear in Byerly (2013) and McCain (2014a), so I will focus on those papers.…”

Section: Beliefs About the Futurementioning

confidence: 99%

Best Explanationism and Justification for Beliefs About the Future

Stoutenburg¹

2015

Episteme

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Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have recently argued that the evidential support relation should be understood in terms of explanatory coherence: roughly, one's evidence supports a proposition if and only if that proposition is part of the best available explanation of the evidence (2008). Their thesis has been criticized through alleged counterexamples, perhaps the most important of which are cases where a subject has a justified belief about the future (Byerly 2013; Byerly and Martin forthcoming). Kevin McCain has defended the thesis against Byerly's counterexample (2013, 2014a). I argue that McCain's defense is inadequate before pointing toward a more promising solution for explanationism. The Byerly-McCain exchange is important because it casts light on the difficult issues of the standards for justification and the nature of epistemic support. Furthermore, McCain's defense of explanationism about epistemic support represents an important recent development of the burgeoning explanationist program in epistemology and philosophy of science.

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“…3 For other proposals, see Byerly (2013a). 4 See Conee and Feldman (2008) as well as the interpretive sections in Byerly (2013b) and McCain (2014b). The argument in Byerly (2013b) for why Conee and Feldman should accept the necessity claim entailed by (EXP) has to do with Conee and Feldman's larger project.…”

Section: Explanationismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Problems for Explanationism on Both Sides

Byerly

Martin

2014

Erkenn

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This paper continues a recent exchange in this journal concerning explanationist accounts of epistemic justification. In the first paper in this exchange, Byerly (2013a, b) argues that explanationist views judge that certain beliefs about the future are unjustified when in fact they are justified. In the second paper, McCain (2014b) defends a version of explanationism which he argues escapes Byerly's criticism. Here we contribute to this exchange in two ways. In the first section, we argue that McCain's defense of explanationism against Byerly's objection is unsuccessful. Then, in the second section, we develop an independent objection to explanationism from a different direction. If our arguments in each section are sound, then not only do explanationist accounts of epistemic justification judge beliefs that are justified to be unjustified, but they judge beliefs that are unjustified to be justified. Explanationism faces problems on both sides.

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Evidentialism, Explanationism, and Beliefs About the Future

Cited by 14 publications

References 5 publications

Problems for Mainstream Evidentialism

Problems for Mainstream Evidentialism

Best Explanationism and Justification for Beliefs About the Future

Problems for Explanationism on Both Sides

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