The evidential contribution of sentences containing evidentials is typically analyzed as belonging to a separate level of illocutionary meaning (e.g. a sincerity condition, [2]) or as a presupposition (e.g., [6,7]). In this talk, I discuss the evidential system of Cheyenne, an Algonquian language spoken in Montana. Based primarily on data collected in the field, I argue for a compositional analysis of evidentials in Cheyenne where the evidential contribution is truth-conditional, but not part of the proposition expressed. This analysis separates the evidential and propositional contributions of sentences with evidentials without appealing to a separate level of illocutionary meaning while explaining the informativeness of the evidential contribution.The Data: A hallmark of 'illocutionary' evidentials cross-linguistically is that the reportative doesn't commit the speaker to the truth, falsity, or possibility of the evidential's scope [2,3,1]. Thus, the speaker can use the reportative evidential to report information she believes to be false. This pattern is exemplified in (1a), adapted from a Quechua example discussed in [2]. Such examples are infelicitous with other evidentials (e.g., direct, conjectural) as well as reportative evidentials in some languages ('propositional' evidentials, e.g. St'át'imcets,[7]). (1) a.É-háéána-sėstse 3-hungry-rpt.3.sg.aFloyd Floyd naa cnj oha onlyé -sáa-háéána-he-∅ 3-neg-hungry-h(an)e-dir 'Floyd's hungry, they say, but (in fact) he isn't hungry,' b. #É-háéána-sėstse 3-hungry-rpt.3.sg.aFloyd Floyd naa cnj oha only ná-sáa-nė-néstó-he-∅ 1-neg-an-hear.b-h(an)e # 'Floyd's hungry, I hear, but I didn't hear that' However, the speaker is committed to having reportative evidence for the evidential's scope. That is, the speaker cannot deny the fact that there was a reporting event where she received the information in the evidential's scope, as shown by example (1b), adapted from [2].Proposal: As argued by [2, a.o.], and as illustrated by the data presented above, the propositional and evidential contributions of sentences with evidentials need to be distinguished. I propose to account for this distinction by treating declarative sentences as sets of propositions (a la [5]).For example, consider the Ty 2 ([4]) translations of the sentences in (1) given in (2): (2i) is the translation the first conjunct of both (1a) and (1b), (2ii) is the second conjunct of (1a), and (2iii) is the second conjunct of (1b). I systematically use the assignment function to represent the context and reserve the variable i to pick out the actual world and the variable x to pick out the speaker. (2) i. (2) represents (the characteristic function of) a set of propositions. If each condition is met, this set will be the singleton of the scopal proposition (e.g. { λj.hungry(j, f loyd) M,g } for (2i)). If a condition is not met, this set will be empty. Thus, if the speaker does not have the specified type of evidence for the scopal proposition, the sentence will denote the empty set.Given the shift to sets of proposit...