Evil and the many universes response

Megill, Jason

doi:10.1007/s11153-010-9280-3

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…This section explains the Multiverse Response to the problem of evil (Forrest 1981;Kraay 2010a;McHarry 1978;Megill 2011;Parfit 1992;Turner 2003). 1 Take a 'universe' to be a maximally connected spacetime.…”

Section: The Multiverse Responsementioning

confidence: 99%

Using Wormholes to Solve the Problem of Evil

Effingham

2020

TheoLogica

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The Multiverse Response to the problem of evil has it that God made our universe because God makes every universe meeting a certain standard. The main problem for that response is that there’s no explanation for why God didn’t just keeping making duplicates of perfect universes. This paper introduces the ‘Multiactualities Response’, which says that God actualises every possible world that meets a certain standard of value. It avoids the corresponding problem about duplication because different propositions must always be true at distinct worlds. The Multiactualities Response nevertheless has its own problem, namely that it requires the possibility of multiple actual worlds. This paper argues that if we consider spacetimes with wormholes, we have good cause to think there can be multiple metaphysically privileged present moments; given a suitable analogy between time and modality, it follows that there can be multiple metaphysically privileged (i.e. actual) worlds. This paper includes an in–depth examination of the metaphysics of both the temporal and modal cases.

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Section: The Multiverse Responsementioning

confidence: 99%

Using Wormholes to Solve the Problem of Evil

Effingham

2020

TheoLogica

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“…Others think it has the resources to significantly enhance existing response strategies (e.g., Schrynemakers 2015). The limit case is Megill (2011), who believes that the bare epistemic possibility of a theistic multiverse completely defeats all arguments from evil, past and present. But all these claims are controversial.…”

Section: The Theistic Multiverse and The Problem Of Evilmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theodicy

2019

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For a topic that many have thought long-solved, theodicy in the 21st-century has thus far produced novel approaches, uncovered new dilemmas, juxtaposed itself with other philosophical and religious fields, listened to new voices, and has even been done through uncommon methodologies. Though never removed from the logical problem, theodicy at least in the near future will generate unique arguments related to the phenomenology of lived suffering, modal claims across worlds, the possibility of ameliorative analysis, narrative theodicy, and standpoint difficulties in generating theodical discourse. This special issue is dedicated to extending the platform for clear and interesting perspectives on new dimensions of theodicy, or in reclaiming perspectives on the topic that have been largely ignored in philosophy of religion.Rather than coming to a consensus about the nature, scope, and future of theodicy, the authors in this volume create new avenues for exploring an age-old problem: is the existence of God consistent or compatible with the presence of suffering in the world?The anthology is organized thematically. The papers in the first grouping all could be headlined under, "New Dimensions in Narrative Theodicy", because they either rely upon narratives for theodical engagement or critically engaged into whether narratives can be used for a theodical purpose. Sue Whatley provides a meta-theodical piece that marries Flannery O'Connor's complication of good and evil to the theology of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's concept of "unification" to argue that despair need not be the ultimate phenomenological experience of suffering. Jill Hernandez draws upon the narrative work of Margaret Cavendish to argue that Cavendish-despite her unorthodox theology-provides a unique advancement about how to eradicate moral evil while preserving free will. Mark Scott prefers to take up the problem of suffering at home, and focuses on hope as a theodical tool, embedded in the work of contemporary American novelist Marilynne Robinson. Poetry, rather than novels, is the means by which A.K. Anderson introduces his concept of "enestological theodicy", the view that that the presence of God is experienced in the midst of suffering through the deeds of humanity.The second segment of essays focuses on "New Dimensions in Worlds and Value", and shifts to multiverse theodicy and the types of worlds God could or should instantiate, if such a being existed. Michael Almeida argues against several leading multiverse theodicians on the basis that they unnecessarily restrict the creation of multiverses to those that meet some threshold of goodness. Klaas Kraay is one such interlocutor of Almeida's, and he replies that Almeida's theistic modal realism is not that different from his view, but instead pivots upon whether the lack of universes that surpass a goodness threshold is a "bug" (as Almeida suggests) or a desirable feature of a theistic ontology (as forwarded by Kraay). Marshall Naylor's paper contends that, regardless of the content of any particula...

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“…Others think it has the resources to significantly enhance existing response strategies (e.g., Hudson 2005;Schrynemakers 2015). The limit case is Megill (2011), who believes that the bare epistemic possibility of a theistic multiverse completely defeats all arguments from evil, past and present. But all these claims are controversial.…”

Section: The Theistic Multiverse and The Problem Of Evilmentioning

confidence: 99%

One Philosopher’s Bug Can Be Another’s Feature: Reply to Almeida’s “Multiverse and Divine Creation”

Kraay¹

2018

Religions

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Michael Almeida once told me that he thought we were just a couple of hours of conversation away from reaching deep agreement about some important topics in the philosophy of religion pertaining to God, multiverses, and modality. This paper represents my attempt to move this conversation forward and to seek this common ground. Specifically, I respond to Almeida's paper entitled "The Multiverse and Divine Creation". In the first four sections, I record my disagreement with him concerning some smaller matters. In Section 5, I try to persuade him that what he considers a 'bug' in the theistic multiverse is actually a feature-and a desirable one at that. In Section 6, I close by identifying some points at which our views seem to converge.

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Evil and the many universes response

Cited by 14 publications

References 14 publications

Using Wormholes to Solve the Problem of Evil

Using Wormholes to Solve the Problem of Evil

Theodicy

One Philosopher’s Bug Can Be Another’s Feature: Reply to Almeida’s “Multiverse and Divine Creation”

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