Evilism, moral rationalism, and reasons internalism

Weaver, Christopher Gregory

doi:10.1007/s11153-014-9472-3

Cited by 11 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Weaver's Kantian approach to the Evil‐god challenge is underpinned by a similar theory to Daniels's: that all moral agents desire what is right, therefore unless one is a “theist with Kantian leanings” (, p. 18)—as Weaver refers to this stance—his argument fails to undermine the Evil‐god challenge. If one rejects either moral rationalism or reasons internalism, his argument is also defunct.…”

Section: Objections To the Evil‐god Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Much of the recent literature disputing the Evil‐god challenge questions whether the EGH is even possible . Several critics (Daniels, ; Ward, ; Weaver, ) have denied the logical possibility of the existence of Evil‐god by appealing to the internal inconsistency of the hypothesis. If the existence of an evil god is a logical impossibility, they claim, then it is senseless to postulate it in the first place.…”

Section: Objections To the Evil‐god Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, it could be claimed that Daniels wrongly assumes Aquinas's synderesis rule—that humans will always veer towards the good unless they are ignorant of it. As Oppy (), Law (), and Weaver () all identify, it seems obvious that moral agents do not always aim towards the good, and some commit evil actions knowingly. According to Graham Oppy (, p. 179), “mundane considerations about weakness of our will and our moral failings show immediately that it is not true that what we desire, all things considered, is (and must always be) what is good from the standpoint of eternity.” Second, it can be suggested that objections of this type mistakenly equate “good” with “desirable.” If the Evil‐god hypothesis were true, Evil‐god would desire what was bad, and what is bad would be right because of this.…”

Section: Objections To the Evil‐god Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Evilism is therefore impossible. (Weaver, , p. 14)According to Weaver, then, moral agents are under the obligation to desire what is right, which Evil‐god would not do; therefore, the existence of Evil‐god is necessarily impossible.…”

Section: Objections To the Evil‐god Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moral rationalism is “the thesis that duties and/or moral obligations either strictly imply practical reasons for action or are identical to such reasons” (Weaver, , p. 8)…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Evil‐god challenge Part II: Objections and responses

Lancaster-Thomas

2018

Philosophy Compass

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The Evil‐god challenge attempts to undermine classical monotheism by arguing that because the existence of an evil god is similar in reasonableness to the existence of a good god, the onus is on the theist to justify their belief in the latter over the former. In the Part I paper, I defined the Evil‐god challenge, distinguished between several types of Evil‐god challenge, and presented its history and recent developments. In this paper, I describe the merits of the challenge, outline and address the main objections that have been posed to it, and discuss some of the implications for classical monotheism if the Evil‐god challenge remains untarnished by objections.

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Section: Objections To the Evil‐god Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Objections To the Evil‐god Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Objections To the Evil‐god Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Objections To the Evil‐god Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moral rationalism is “the thesis that duties and/or moral obligations either strictly imply practical reasons for action or are identical to such reasons” (Weaver, , p. 8)…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Evil‐god challenge Part II: Objections and responses

Lancaster-Thomas

2018

Philosophy Compass

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How to See the Good in the Foundation

Rasmussen

2019

Is God the Best Explanation of Things?

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Strategies for stage II of cosmological arguments

Ocampo

2024

Int J Philos Relig

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The following article will examine three argumentative strategies to address a recent topic of debate in the philosophy of religion known as the "Gap Problem." It aims to study the "Stage II" of cosmological arguments, where the goal is to establish the theistic properties or attributes that identify the first cause or necessary being with the concept of God. The unique contribution of this study lies in the formalized and systematic presentation of the various solutions proposed by authors in the philosophical field, synthesizing their central ideas and presenting them in the form of arguments.Historically, the development of the cosmological argument has focused on establishing Stage I, while Stage II has not received the same attention. 1 Therefore, in this article, we will focus on the study of Stage II, presenting the different approaches and arguments put forth by contemporary philosophers to "close" the gap between these two stages and solve the so-called "Gap Problem." Is the "Gap Problem" a real problem?Conceptually, there is a central issue with the so-called "Gap Problem," and that is that it doesn't pose a true problem for the theist. This is because, generally, theistic arguments (in this case, cosmological arguments) are presented as pieces of evidence in favor of theism as a metaphysical worldview. The role of the argument in this case is to demonstrate the reasonableness of theism and increase its probability, even if Stage II of the argument has not been analyzed.To illustrate this point, let's use a generic cosmological argument as an example:1. Something exists. 2. If everything is contingent, then there is no external explanation for contingent things (why contingent things exist). 3. There is an external explanation for contingent things. 4. Therefore, not everything is contingent. 5. Therefore, something non-contingent exists. 6. Therefore, there exists a necessary entity. 2 1 There are some notable exceptions, particularly Thomas Aquinas, who dedicates almost the entire first book of his Summa Contra Gentiles to establish the divine attributes of esse subsistens (subsisting being). See Thomas Aquinas, Saint. Summa contra Gentiles I.

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Evilism, moral rationalism, and reasons internalism

Cited by 11 publications

References 31 publications

The Evil‐god challenge Part II: Objections and responses

The Evil‐god challenge Part II: Objections and responses

How to See the Good in the Foundation

Strategies for stage II of cosmological arguments

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