Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations

Weerd, Harmen de; Verbrugge, Rineke

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.08.034

Cited by 26 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 78 publications

(110 reference statements)

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“…Among the !Kung, 'strong' individuals who are valued social partners (good hunters, musicians, healers) tend to coordinate enforcement of social norms [101]. Heterogeneity in punishment cost across individuals makes it easier to stabilize altruistic behaviour in the provisioning of a public good [102], and experiments indicate that group members tend to tacitly agree on the individual who can punish at least cost as punisher [103] and believe that dominant individuals can punish more successfully and with lower risk of retaliation [104]. Even where group members are equally motivated, greater strength or coalitional support on the part of leaders may reduce the effort and time required to solicit the joint attention of group members and to generate consensus regarding an action plan [1].…”

Section: (A) Leadership In Non-humansmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societies

Glowacki

Rueden

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

202

142

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One contribution of 13 to a theme issue 'Solving the puzzle of collective action through inter-individual differences: evidence from primates and humans'. Observation of leadership in small-scale societies offers unique insights into the evolution of human collective action and the origins of sociopolitical complexity. Using behavioural data from the Tsimane forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia and Nyangatom nomadic pastoralists of Ethiopia, we evaluate the traits of leaders and the contexts in which leadership becomes more institutional. We find that leaders tend to have more capital, in the form of age-related knowledge, body size or social connections. These attributes can reduce the costs leaders incur and increase the efficacy of leadership. Leadership becomes more institutional in domains of collective action, such as resolution of intragroup conflict, where collective action failure threatens group integrity. Together these data support the hypothesis that leadership is an important means by which collective action problems are overcome in small-scale societies.

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Section: (A) Leadership In Non-humansmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societies

Glowacki

Rueden

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

202

142

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“…Theoretically, punishment could evolve if some individuals can punish more cheaply than others (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011). Experimentally, heterogeneity in the cost of punishment does induce cooperation Nikiforakis, Normann, & Wallace, 2009).…”

Section: Who Punishes?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Punishes? The Status of the Punishers Affects the Perceived Success of, and Indirect Benefits From, “Moralistic” Punishment

Gordon

Lea

2016

Evol Psychol

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''Moralistic'' punishment of free riders can provide a beneficial reputation, but the immediate behavior is costly to the punisher. In Study 1, we investigated whether variation in status would be perceived to offset or mitigate the costs of punishment. One hundred and nineteen participants were presented with a vignette describing a punishment scenario. Participants predicted whether punishment would occur, how successful it would be, and indicated their attitude to the punisher. Participants believed only intervention by a high-status (HS) individual would be successful and that low-status (LS) individuals would not intervene at all. HS individuals predicted to punish successfully were seen as more formidable and likable. Study 2 investigated whether punishment was necessary to maintain an HS position. One hundred and seventeen participants were presented with a vignette describing a punishment scenario. Participants were asked to indicate whether they wished to be led by the punisher. HS individuals who did not punish were less likely to be chosen as leaders compared to HS punishers, whereas LS individuals who punished were no more or less likely to be chosen than nonpunishers. The results of both studies suggest that only HS individuals are expected to punish, likely because such a position offsets some of the costs of punishment. As a result, only HS individual can access the reputation benefits from punishment. Furthermore, an HS position may be dependent on the willingness to punish antisocial behavior. The ramifications that these results may have for the evolution of moralistic punishment are discussed.

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“…"third-order punishment" to maintain second-order punishment, and so on), several models rely on the existence of "second-order" punishment of non-punishers (e.g. Axelrod, 1986;Boyd & Richerson, 1992;Brandt, Hauert, & Sigmund, 2006;Fowler, 2005;Henrich, 2004;Henrich & Boyd, 2001;Sober & Wilson, 1999;de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011). As such, we need to ask: do people tend to punish non-punishers, as predicted by these models?…”

Section: Second-order Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Sanction? Functional Causes of Punishment and Reward

Barclay¹,

Kiyonari²

2014

Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas

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Many disciplines find it puzzling that costly cooperation exists within groups of non-kin. Cooperation can be sustained when non-cooperators are punished or when cooperators are rewarded, but these sanctions are themselves costly to provide. As such, we must ask: what forces maintain the existence of sanctioning? Why do people possess a psychology that includes punitive sentiment and a willingness to reward? Many theoretical models rely on "second-order punishment", which means that people will punish those who do not punish non-cooperators. However, our review of the evidence suggests that people do not readily do this, and do not particularly like punishers. This calls into question any theories that rely on this second-order punishment. By contrast, people will readily reward those who reward cooperators, which suggests that rewards may function as part of a system of indirect reciprocity where cooperators (and rewarders) are seen as "good" thus worthy of help. So what does sustain punitive sentiment? Punishment may function to signal qualities of the punisher that are otherwise difficult to observe, such as the punisher's trustworthiness or willingness to retaliate against personal affronts. Alternately, punishment may simply be a "Volunteer's Dilemma" where it becomes rational to "volunteer" to punish non-cooperators if no one else in the group will. Finally, we discuss how positive and negative sanctions may function differently to maintain large-scale human cooperation, depending on the proportion of cooperators in a population and the necessity for unanimous cooperation.

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Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations

Cited by 26 publications

References 78 publications

Leadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societies

Leadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societies

Who Punishes? The Status of the Punishers Affects the Perceived Success of, and Indirect Benefits From, “Moralistic” Punishment

Why Sanction? Functional Causes of Punishment and Reward

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