Evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with interactive diversity

Huang, Yongchao; Wan, Siyi; Zheng, Junjun; Liu, Wenyi

doi:10.1016/j.physa.2023.128794

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

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“…Our model demonstrates that a stable coexistence of reciprocal altruists and free riders is attainable through a strategy which is solely reliant on indirect reciprocity, without the need for additional mechanisms such as direct or spatial reciprocity. Spatial reciprocity, like direct reciprocity, is a mechanism of reciprocity [31] which continues to be extensively studied [32][33][34][35]. Spatial reciprocity is characterized by a spatial or subgroup structure-or relatedness-among interacting individuals, which can increase cooperation among likeminded individuals.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolution of Cooperation and Diversity under Integrated Indirect Reciprocity

Sasaki,

Uchida,

Okada

et al. 2024

Games

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Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms driving the evolution of cooperation in human societies. There are two types of indirect reciprocity: upstream and downstream reciprocity. Cooperation in downstream reciprocity follows the pattern ‘You helped someone, and I will help you’, while the direction of cooperation is reversed in upstream reciprocity, which follows the pattern ‘You helped me, and I will help someone else’. These two types of indirect reciprocity often occur in combination. However, upstream and downstream reciprocity have mostly been theoretically studied in isolation. In this study, we propose a new model that integrates both types of reciprocity. In particular, we apply the standard giving-game framework of indirect reciprocity and analyze the three-strategy model including reciprocal altruists, indiscriminate altruists, and free riders using evolutionary game theory. We show that the model allows reciprocal altruists and free riders to coexist stably in well-mixed populations. We also find that by accounting for inattention in the assessment rule, the stability of this mixed equilibrium can be strengthened to prevent the invasion of infamous indiscriminate altruists and can even be made globally stable.

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