Evolution of cooperation through cumulative reciprocity

Li, Juan; Zhao, Xiaowei; Li, Bing; Rossetti, Charlotte S. L.; Hilbe, Christian; Xia, Haoxiang

doi:10.1038/s43588-022-00334-w

Cited by 23 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…Adding noise can force a more diverse history of play, which makes it easier to tell strategies apart. When that is the case, longer-memory strategies and more lenient strategies become more popular (Fudenberg et al, 2012;Li et al, 2022).…”

Section: Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The presence of such noise changes how people play and which strategies they use. Already with a small level of noise, cooperation decreases (Aoyagi et al, 2003; Fudenberg et al, 2012; Li et al, 2022). This might be because strategies in treatments with noise tend to look further backward in time.…”

Section: Impact Of Design Choices and Parameters On Human Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By letting subjects choose from a finite strategy set, we also risk missing a strategy that would be popular had it existed in the menu of possible strategies. The other, more common approach is to infer strategy from actual choices (Dal Bó & Fréchette, 2011, 2018; Embrey et al, 2018; Friedman & Oprea, 2012; Fudenberg et al, 2012; Li et al, 2022; Mao et al, 2017; Milinski & Wedekind, 1998; Montero‐Porras et al, 2022; Palfrey & Rosenthal, 1994; Wedekind & Milinski, 1996). This method is more cumbersome and different techniques exist.…”

Section: Evolving Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Adding noise can force a more diverse history of play, which makes it easier to tell strategies apart. When that is the case, longer‐memory strategies and more lenient strategies become more popular (Fudenberg et al, 2012; Li et al, 2022). Surprisingly, however, these experiments give little support to WSLS , which usually emerges in evolutionary simulations (Hauert & Schuster, 1997; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993).…”

Section: Evolving Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Direct reciprocity among humans

Rossetti,

Hilbe

2023

Ethology

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Direct reciprocity is the tendency to repay others' cooperation. This tendency can be crucial to maintain cooperation in evolving populations. Once direct reciprocity evolves, individuals have a long‐run interest to cooperate, even if it is costly in the short run. The major theoretical framework to describe reciprocal behavior is the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Over the past decades, this game has been the major workhorse to predict when reciprocal cooperation ought to evolve, and which strategies individuals are supposed to adopt. Herein, we compare these predictions with the empirical evidence from experiments with human subjects. From a theory‐driven perspective, humans represent an ideal test case, because they give researchers the most flexibility to tailor the experimental design to the assumptions of a model. Overall, we find that theoretical models describe well in which situations people cooperate. However, in the important case of “indefinitely repeated games,” they have difficulties to predict which strategies people use.

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Section: Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Impact Of Design Choices and Parameters On Human Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Evolving Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Evolving Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Direct reciprocity among humans

Rossetti,

Hilbe

2023

Ethology

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“…During the past decades, there has been a considerable effort to explore whether conditionally cooperative behaviors would emerge naturally (e.g., [11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]). To this end, researchers study the dynamics in evolving populations, in which strategies are transmitted either by biological or cultural evolution (by inheritance or imitation).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptive dynamics of memory-1 strategies in the repeated donation game

LaPorte

Hilbe

Nowak

2023

Preprint

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Social interactions often take the form of a social dilemma: collectively, individuals fare best if everybody cooperates, yet each single individual is tempted to free ride. Social dilemmas can be resolved when individuals interact repeatedly. Repetition allows individuals to adopt reciprocal strategies which incentivize cooperation. The most basic model to study reciprocity is the repeated donation game, a variant of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Two players interact over many rounds, in which they repeatedly decide whether to cooperate or to defect. To make their decisions, they need a strategy that tells them what to do depending on the history of previous play. Memory-1 strategies depend on the previous round only. Even though memory-1 strategies are among the most elementary strategies of reciprocity, their evolutionary dynamics has been difficult to study analytically. As a result, most previous work relies on simulations. Here, we derive and analyze their adaptive dynamics. We show that the four-dimensional space of memory-1 strategies has an invariant three-dimensional subspace, generated by the memory-1 counting strategies. Counting strategies record how many players cooperated in the previous round, without considering who cooperated. We give a partial characterization of adaptive dynamics for memory-1 strategies and a full characterization for memory-1 counting strategies.Author summaryDirect reciprocity is a mechanism for evolution of cooperation based on the repeated interaction of the same players. In the most basic setting, we consider a game between two players and in each round they choose between cooperation and defection. Hence, there are four possible outcomes: (i) both cooperate; (ii) I cooperate, you defect; (ii) I defect, you cooperate; (iv) both defect. A memory-1 strategy for playing this game is characterized by four quantities which specify the probabilities to cooperate in the next round depending on the outcome of the current round. We study evolutionary dynamics in the space of all memory-1 strategies. We assume that mutant strategies are generated in close proximity to the existing strategies, and therefore we can use the framework of adaptive dynamics, which is deterministic.

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Evolution of Cumulative Reciprocity in Structured Populations

Luo,

Tian,

et al. 2024

Communications in Computer and Information Science

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Evolution of cooperation through cumulative reciprocity

Cited by 23 publications

References 57 publications

Direct reciprocity among humans

Direct reciprocity among humans

Adaptive dynamics of memory-1 strategies in the repeated donation game

Evolution of Cumulative Reciprocity in Structured Populations

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