Evolution of Mutualism Between Globeflowers and their Pollinating Flies

Ferdy, Jean‐Baptiste; Després, Laurence; Godelle, Bernard

doi:10.1006/jtbi.2002.3018

Cited by 47 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Our approach thus provides a mechanistic implementation of the idea that, in symbioses, the partner that controls the physical resources (as opposed to providing the services, such as pollination or nitrogen fixation) ultimately controls the relationship, regardless of relative evolutionary rates (Herre 1989;West & Herre 1994;Yu 2001;West et al 2002a,b;Ferdy et al 2002;Yu & Ridley 2003).…”

Section: (B) Testing the Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Chiastocheta flies are beneficial in that they pollinate, but they also lay eggs, and the larvae eat some fraction of the seeds. Ferdy et al (2002) argue that because the uniquely enclosed corolla of Trollius europaeus increases the survivorship of the earliest laid eggs (protecting them from parasitism and the elements) and because subsequent larval competition for food is so intense, the flower ends up imposing selection on the flies to lay few eggs, thereby shifting the balance of pollination and seed predation to a net mutualistic outcome (see also Yu & Ridley (2003) for a review, and Shapiro & Addicott (2003) for a potentially similar phenomenon in yucca plants).…”

Section: (B) Testing the Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Oviposition strategies, host coercion and the stable exploitation of figs by wasps

Ridley

Jousselin

et al. 2004

Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B

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A classic example of a mutualism is the one between fig plants (Ficus) and their specialized and obligate pollinating wasps. The wasps deposit eggs in fig ovules, which the larvae then consume. Because the wasps derive their fitness only from consumed seeds, this mutualism can persist only if the wasps are prevented from laying eggs in all ovules. The search for mechanisms that can limit oviposition and stabilize the wasp-seed conflict has spanned more than three decades. We use a simple foraging model, parameterized with data from two Ficus species, to show how fig morphology reduces oviposition rates and helps to resolve the wasp-seed conflict. We also propose additional mechanisms, based on known aspects of fig biology, which can prevent even large numbers of wasps from ovipositing in all ovules. It has been suggested that in mutualistic symbioses, the partner that controls the physical resources, in this case Ficus, ultimately controls the rate at which hosts are converted to visitors, regardless of relative evolutionary rates. Our approach provides a mechanistic implementation of this idea, with potential applications to other mutualisms and to theories of virulence.

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Section: (B) Testing the Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: (B) Testing the Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oviposition strategies, host coercion and the stable exploitation of figs by wasps

Ridley

Jousselin

et al. 2004

Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B

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“…One approach that is proving promising is the concept of host coercion (Murray 1985;Herre 1989;West & Herre 1994;Yu 2001;Ferdy et al 2002;West et al 2002a,b;Hoeksema & Kummel 2003;Yu & Ridley 2003;Yu et al 2004a;Edwards et al in preparation), which argues that the partner controlling the physical resources (the host) ultimately controls the relationship, as opposed to the partner providing the services (the visitor).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selection for protection in an ant–plant mutualism: host sanctions, host modularity, and the principal–agent game

et al. 2005

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Retaliation against cheaters can prevent the breakdown of cooperation. Here we ask whether the ant-plant Cordia nodosa is able to apply retaliatory sanctions against its ant symbiont Allomerus octoarticulatus, which patrols new shoots to prevent herbivory. We test the hypothesis that the modular design of C. nodosa physiologically ties the growth of housing (stem swellings known as domatia) to the successful development of the attached leaves. We experimentally simulated herbivory by cutting leaves from patrolled shoots and found that the domatia on such 'cheated' shoots suffered higher mortality and lower growth than did controls, evidence for a host sanction. On the other hand, patrolling is costly to the ant, and experiment shows that non-patrollers run a low risk of being sanctioned because most leaves (and the attached domatia) escape heavy herbivory even when patrollers are absent. This suggests that cheaters might enjoy a higher fitness than do mutualists, despite sanctions, but we find that patrolling provides a net fecundity benefit when the colony and plant exceed a minimum size, which requires sustained ant investment in patrolling. These results map directly onto the principal-agent (P-A) game from economics, which we suggest can be used as a framework for studying stability in mutualisms, where high sampling costs and cheating do not allow market effects to select for mutual benefits.

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“…[1][2][3][4][5], mutualism theory has only recently begun to be formalized (6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15), and major questions remain open. One of these questions concerns whether mutualists evolve to punish cheaters (1, 7-10, 16, 17).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic contract theory tests models of mutualism

Weyl

Frederickson

et al. 2010

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

101

137

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Although mutualisms are common in all ecological communities and have played key roles in the diversification of life, our current understanding of the evolution of cooperation applies mostly to social behavior within a species. A central question is whether mutualisms persist because hosts have evolved costly punishment of cheaters. Here, we use the economic theory of employment contracts to formulate and distinguish between two mechanisms that have been proposed to prevent cheating in host-symbiont mutualisms, partner fidelity feedback (PFF) and host sanctions (HS). Under PFF, positive feedback between host fitness and symbiont fitness is sufficient to prevent cheating; in contrast, HS posits the necessity of costly punishment to maintain mutualism. A coevolutionary model of mutualism finds that HS are unlikely to evolve de novo, and published data on legume-rhizobia and yucca-moth mutualisms are consistent with PFF and not with HS. Thus, in systems considered to be textbook cases of HS, we find poor support for the theory that hosts have evolved to punish cheating symbionts; instead, we show that even horizontally transmitted mutualisms can be stabilized via PFF. PFF theory may place previously underappreciated constraints on the evolution of mutualism and explain why punishment is far from ubiquitous in nature.evolution of cooperation | punishment | symbiosis | partner fidelity feedback | host sanctions

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Evolution of Mutualism Between Globeflowers and their Pollinating Flies

Cited by 47 publications

References 23 publications

Oviposition strategies, host coercion and the stable exploitation of figs by wasps

Oviposition strategies, host coercion and the stable exploitation of figs by wasps

Selection for protection in an ant–plant mutualism: host sanctions, host modularity, and the principal–agent game

Economic contract theory tests models of mutualism

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