Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in multi-game populations

Chen, Wenman; Wang, Xianjia; Quan, Ji

doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2021.127882

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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Section: Simulation Of Gs Response Relationships Based On Evolutionar...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(3) Algorithm design for evolutionary game of relational networks Based on the above analysis, the algorithm of the game of evolution of the relationship network of governance subjects in the Antarctic region (Figure 2) was finally designed to determine the optimal state of stable cooperation in the game of evolution of the relationship network of governance subjects in the Antarctic region [51]: Step 1: Establish a network of relationships for governance in the Antarctic region by entering the number of initial governance subject collaborators 𝑀 , investment cost C, long-term benefits p, and benefit intensity r;…”

Section: Simulation Of Gs Response Relationships Based On Evolutionar...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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How to Perceive National Governance Networks in the Global Commons of the Earth’s Surface: A Case Study of the Antarctic

Li,

Shen

2024

Land

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The destiny of mankind is closely intertwined, and exploring new paths for the governance of the global commons of the earth’s surface (GCES) has become a worldwide topic. Thus, this paper attempts to carry out the following work by taking the Antarctic as an example: (1) Identify the characteristics of the governance subjects by using a literature review and the inductive analysis method. (2) Construct a network of responsive relationships among the governance subjects based on the evolutionary game approach. This study found the following: (1) A multi-subject participation in governance, i.e., with the Antarctic Treaty parties as the core, the seven major organizations as the main force, the United Nations as the support, enterprises as the emerging force, and other countries as the potential subjects. (2) Response-relational networks have high clustering coefficients and characteristic path lengths close to those of random networks, with significant small-world features of relational networks. (3) As important components of the benefit function, long-term benefits and benefit intensities together influence cooperative strategies for governance in the Antarctic. In the future, we should actively focus on long-term interests based on the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind, improve the governance structure at the right time, and strive to build a robust globalization.

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Section: Simulation Of Gs Response Relationships Based On Evolutionar...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Simulation Of Gs Response Relationships Based On Evolutionar...mentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Perceive National Governance Networks in the Global Commons of the Earth’s Surface: A Case Study of the Antarctic

Li,

Shen

2024

Land

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“…The prisoner's dilemma lies in the fact that individually rational behavior leads to an individually optimal and collectively sub-optimal outcome, which means that the behaviors adopted by out-group pedestrians may make their own evacuation time the shortest, but the overall evacuation time of pedestrians and their interacting objects increases. Therefore, the interaction between out-group pedestrians is similar to the prisoner's dilemma, and it can be indicated in this game [28,29]. The harmony game is based on the idea that the individual optimal strategy is the same as the collective optimal strategy.…”

Section: Behavioral Interaction Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Cooperation Behaviors and Crowd Dynamics during Pedestrian Evacuation with Group Existence

Huo

et al. 2022

Sustainability

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At most public places where large-scale events are held, the crowd as a pedestrian particle system is a mixture of individuals and groups rather than a pure collection of individuals. The interaction behaviors of pedestrians within the same group and between different groups are significantly disparate, which makes the crowd evacuation process more complex. To address this issue, a new pedestrian evacuation model is proposed incorporating the cellular automaton model and game theory. In the model, two game theory models named prisoner’s dilemma and harmony game are applied to depict the interaction mechanism between pedestrians, and the decision-making of one pedestrian regarding route choice is subject to the environment factor and interaction payoffs between his neighbors. The influences of the intensity of interaction between pedestrians, the willingness to cooperate, the number of groups, the size of groups, and the initial distribution pattern of groups on the evacuation dynamics and cooperation evolution of the crowd are discussed. Simulation results show that it is beneficial to the evacuation efficiency and the formation of cooperation behaviors when pedestrians have a low intensity of interaction. As the willingness of large groups to cooperate is high, an increase in group’ sizes and numbers can improve the cooperation fraction of the crowd but prolongs evacuation time. Groups in the crowd gathered together initially negatively affect the evacuation efficiency of the crowd.

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Evolutionary dynamics from fluctuating environments with deterministic and stochastic noises

et al. 2022

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Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in multi-game populations

Cited by 12 publications

References 31 publications

How to Perceive National Governance Networks in the Global Commons of the Earth’s Surface: A Case Study of the Antarctic

How to Perceive National Governance Networks in the Global Commons of the Earth’s Surface: A Case Study of the Antarctic

Analysis of Cooperation Behaviors and Crowd Dynamics during Pedestrian Evacuation with Group Existence

Evolutionary dynamics from fluctuating environments with deterministic and stochastic noises

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