Evolutionary Game Analysis of BIM Adoption among Stakeholders in PPP Projects

Jia, Chao; Zhang, Ruixue; Wang, Dan

doi:10.1155/2021/5553785

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…At the same time, information asymmetry gives owners a blind spot for energy-saving information. They are skeptical of ESCOs' credit, technical level, and service level, which also leads to the endogenous motivation of owners to carry out a retrofit [35]. Therefore, only when owners recognize the value of LRRB and are willing to pay certain incremental costs for it can the value of LRRB be truly reflected.…”

Section: Analysis Of Subjects' Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on the Behavior Strategy of the Subject of Low-Carbon Retrofit of Residential Buildings Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

2023

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Under carbon peaking and neutrality constraints, low-carbon retrofitting of residential buildings (LRRB) has become a strategic need for most countries worldwide. However, the development of China’s LRRB market still relies on government guidance without moving towards the goal of autonomous orientation. This area is still a concern for academics. Moreover, many stakeholders are involved in the LRRB, and the secondary stakeholders’ behavioral strategies do not substantially impact the LRRB. So, this paper adopts Mitchell’s score-based approach to identify the core stakeholders, followed by a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, ESCOs, and owners. Based on the system dynamics (SD) model, the evolution rules of the three parties’ behavior strategies and evolution stabilization strategies are analyzed, and the key factors influencing the equilibrium are found. The results of the study show that under the condition that the government adopts the same level of subsidy for ESCOs and owners, ESCOs are more sensitive to the subsidy; with the introduction of penalties under the premise of subsidy, ESCOs can reach evolutionary equilibrium faster; and when the benefits of owners accepting LRRB outweigh the losses, owners will eventually choose to accept retrofit regardless of whether the government subsidizes owners or not. Finally, the paper ends with suggestions for developing an LRRB market. The game model proposed in this paper can provide a scientific reference for stakeholders’ carbon reduction decisions.

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Section: Analysis Of Subjects' Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on the Behavior Strategy of the Subject of Low-Carbon Retrofit of Residential Buildings Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

2023

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“…To promote the application of BIM technology in PPP projects, Jia et al [31] established a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government, social capital, and contractors and analysed the key influencing factors of the equilibrium strategy through numerical simulation.…”

Section: Jia Et Al [31]mentioning

confidence: 99%

Intelligent Construction Technology Adoption Driving Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Zhang

Li-hong

2022

Journal of Environmental and Public Health

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The adoption of intelligent construction technology (ICT) is regarded as one of the important strategies for the transformation and upgrading of the Chinese construction industry and the achievement of high-quality development. In the ICT adoption process, the government is the driving subject, the owner is an important subject, and ICT is applied in practice by the general contractor. This study first analyses the evolutionary process and the impact of participants’ strategy choices on the system equilibrium by establishing a tripartite evolutionary game framework which includes the government, the owner, and the general contractor as the main stakeholders; then tests the feasibility and rationality of the model by analysing the ESS corresponding to the three phases of ICT adoption. The results show that the conditions for each ESS to be established mainly depend on the relationship between the costs and benefits of each stakeholder, and that owners are more sensitive to government subsidies and penalties than general contractors, so the government should establish a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism based on the results of the model. High adoption costs are a key barrier to ICT adoption for both owners and general contractors. This paper provides a new framework for research related to ICT adoption and a reference for the strategic adjustment of stakeholders in ICT adoption.

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“…Existing studies are based on consumer payment, without considering other payment mechanisms of PPP projects. The stakeholders of PPP projects may choose different behavioral strategies for low-carbon technology innovation under different payment mechanisms [ 23 ]. The key issue to promote the diffusion of low-carbon technology innovation in PPP projects is how to clarify the behavior evolutionary mechanism of low-carbon technology innovation among stakeholders under different payment mechanisms and explicit the main factors affecting the stakeholders’ behavior.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis of low-carbon technology innovation diffusion under PPP mode in China

2022

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With the Public–Private Partnership (PPP) mode playing an increasingly important role in the investment of infrastructure, promoting the diffusion of low-carbon technology innovation in PPP projects not only helps to reduce the carbon emissions of infrastructure, but also plays an important demonstration role in the low-carbon transformation of construction industry. In order to clarify the evolutionary mechanism of low-carbon technology innovation diffusion among stakeholders under the unique payment mechanism of PPP projects in China, the paper builds two different evolutionary game models respectively under government payment mechanism and consumer payment mechanism based on evolutionary game theory. The evolutionary relationship between the choice of behavior strategies and the change of influencing factors under different payment mechanisms are analyzed by numerical simulation. It is found that under government payment mechanism, the regulation cost of government to promote low-carbon technology innovation and the punishment of the superior regulatory authority for non-regulation behavior are the important factors affecting government’s behavioral strategies. The low-carbon technology innovation cost of social capital and the intensity of government subsidy and punishment are the main factors affecting social capital’s behavioral strategies; Under consumer payment mechanism, consumer becomes the ultimate payer of low-carbon products, and the income they get from purchasing low-carbon products and the subsidy provided by the government become the main factors determining consumer’s behavioral strategies. Finally, from the perspective of government, social capital and consumer, countermeasures and management implications are put forward to effectively promote the diffusion of low-carbon technology innovation under different payment mechanism in PPP projects.

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of BIM Adoption among Stakeholders in PPP Projects

Cited by 14 publications

References 35 publications

Study on the Behavior Strategy of the Subject of Low-Carbon Retrofit of Residential Buildings Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Study on the Behavior Strategy of the Subject of Low-Carbon Retrofit of Residential Buildings Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Intelligent Construction Technology Adoption Driving Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Evolutionary game analysis of low-carbon technology innovation diffusion under PPP mode in China

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