State-owned forest farms are key players in managing forestry resources worldwide, playing a pivotal role in advancing the development of the non-timber forest product industry. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving “government–state-owned forest farms–farmer households” to delve into how state-owned forest farms collaborate with governments and farmer households to propel the growth of the non-timber forest product industry. Additionally, it explores the interactive relationships among multiple stakeholders and their asymptotic stability. The findings reveal that (1) under certain conditions, the game model can achieve four stable equilibrium strategies: (0,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,1,1), and (1,1,1). (2) Key factors influencing the tripartite game include the political performance and administrative costs of local governments involved in the industry’s development, assessment performance and reduced management and protection expenses of state-owned forest farms, and sales revenue and planting costs of farmers’ under-forest products. (3) The market development costs shared by state-owned forest farms and government subsidies for under-forest planting should be within a reasonable range. This ensures effective promotion of farmers’ participation in under-forest planting while maintaining the willingness of state-owned forest farms and governments to actively engage. These findings provide concrete guidelines that policymakers can use to spur sustainable growth in the NTFP sector.
