Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Residents’ Participation in Waste Separation Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory

Abstract

Government and residents’ participation in waste separation is a complex non-cooperative game process, and the evolutionary game can explain the behavior of participating subjects well. Considering that the traditional evolutionary game cannot satisfactorily explain the irrational psychology and risk preference factors of the participating issues, this study combines the prospect theory and evolutionary game, uses the prospect value function to supplement and improve the parameters of the evolutionary game payment matrix, and analyzes the evolutionary stabilization strategy. To verify the theoretical results, simulation experiments and impact analysis were conducted, and meaningful results were obtained: There are two stable evolutionary strategies in the system, namely higher participation benefits for residents and lower participation costs and opportunity costs, and reasonable direct benefit distribution coefficients all help to increase the participation rate of waste separation. This study can provide some scientific suggestions for the government to design and build a waste-separation system.

The Supervision Mechanism of Residents’ Waste Separation Behavior: Analysis Using a Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

“…The result is similar with Chen and Gao [ 59 ] who used multi-agent-based simulation to investigate the learning measures of residents' waste separation behavior. This finding also echoes the study of Zhang et al [ 58 ] who found that higher waste separation benefits and lower costs can increase residents' participation rates of waste separation. This indicated that it is necessary not only to reduce the cost of sorting waste and increase the penalty for non-classification but also to reduce the management costs of property service companies, as well as to increase subsidies for them.…”

“…Wu et al [ 17 ] established the evolutionary game model involving the government and residents in municipal household waste separation. Based on the prospect theory and evolutionary game, Zhang et al [ 58 ] investigated the behavior change process of government and residents to understand how to optimize the benefits of waste separation for stakeholders. Chen and Gao [ 59 ] analyzed the behavioral strategies of residents, waste disposal companies, and the government in waste separation and recycling using evolutionary games and studied the stability of the evolutionary system through multi-agent-based simulation.…”

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low-Carbon Incentive Behaviour of Power Battery Recycling Based on Prospect Theory

“…In terms of waste resource utilization, Wang et al [43] integrated prospect theory into the trilateral evolutionary game theory to analyse the utilization process of construction waste resources by local governments, construction companies, and the public. Zhang et al [44] combined prospect theory and evolutionary games and found that residents' participation benefits are higher, participation costs and opportunity costs are lower, and reasonable direct benefit distribution coefficients can help increase the participation rate in waste classification. In terms of carbon emission reduction, Zhang et al [45] used the two-party evolutionary game model of prospect theory to study the interactive relationship between local governments and port enterprises in the context of green port construction.…”