Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Production
Supervision Considering Limited Resources
of the Enterprise

Ma, Yanhong; Wan, Zhiyong; Jin, Chun Hua

doi:10.15244/pjoes/127304

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Under the traditional regulatory instrument, the static penalty mechanism can promote the rapid transformation of enterprises to produce low-carbon products. This finding is consistent with the majority of the literature Ma et al, 2021).…”

Section: Simulation Of Dynamic Punishment Mechanismsupporting

confidence: 94%

“…The demand for low-carbon products also increases rapidly. But due to the low-carbon products having high cost, high risk and long payback period for enterprises, the initiative of enterprises to supply low-carbon products is insufficient in the short term (Ma et al, 2021). Therefore, there is a certain degree of shortage in the number and types of low-carbon products in the market .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Can Internet regulation encourage companies to produce low-carbon products? — The effective stability of Internet supervision and punishment mechanism

Wang

2023

Preprint

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Because of the short-term diseconomies and externalities of low-carbon products, effective government intervention becomes a necessary tool for enterprises to produce low-carbon products. Under government regulation, a dynamic evolutionary game model is used for theoretical analysis. And the case data of new energy vehicle enterprises are used for simulation to explore the implementation effects of different punishment mechanisms on enterprises' production of low-carbon products. The results show that: (i) in the game between government and enterprises, consumers' green preferences, the differentiation between low-carbon products and high-carbon products, including the difference in cost and environmental friendliness, the market demand, and the purchase cost are important factors affecting game strategies. (ii) Under traditional regulatory, both the static and dynamic penalty mechanisms are favorable for enterprises to adopt the strategy of producing low-carbon products. What' more, the stronger the penalty, the faster the enterprises transform to produce low-carbon products. (iii) Under Internet regulatory, the strong dynamic penalty mechanism can better promote enterprises to produce low-carbon products, while the static penalty mechanism can't promote enterprises to produce low-carbon products effectively. On this basis, it is suggested that while regulating enterprises' production behavior, the government could also increase the demand for green consumption to pull enterprises to produce low-carbon products. In addition, it is suggested that the government's regulatory approach should be matched with the penalty mechanism, and the synergistic effect among regulatory instruments should be skillfully utilized, so as to promote the process of sustainable social development.

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Section: Simulation Of Dynamic Punishment Mechanismsupporting

confidence: 94%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Internet regulation encourage companies to produce low-carbon products? — The effective stability of Internet supervision and punishment mechanism

Wang

2023

Preprint

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show abstract

“…The ESS point can only appear in a combination of pure strategies [45,46]. Therefore, the asymptotic stability of the pure strategy point needs to be assessed.…”

Section: S S S S Xy S S Y S S S S X Y S S Ymentioning

confidence: 99%

Improvement of the Ecological Protection Compensation Policy for Adjustment of Planting Structure in an Area of Groundwater Overexploitation: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study

Xiu¹,

Ni²,

Xie³

et al. 2022

Pol. J. Environ. Stud.

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The Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region of China experiences overexploitation of groundwater (GW), mainly through agricultural water use. Planting structure adjustment (PSA) has proved to be effective in controlling GW use, although this inevitably affects the stakeholders. An ecological protection compensation (EPC) policy has been implemented simultaneously with PSA to meet the compensation needs of those who have lost profits. However, problems in policy design and implementation resulted in insufficient sustainability of the EPC. This study aimed to resolve these problems fundamentally by improving the current policy, based on the analysis of the interactions among the central government, the local government, and the farmers. Firstly, a mechanism for implemented economic penalties for violations was introduced. Secondly, the long-term interests and respective characteristics of all parties were taken into consideration. Finally, a tripartite evolutionary game model was established. Analysis based on evolutionary game theory allowed calculation of the constraints of the parameters in the model, which can drive the model to evolve in the expected direction. Under these constraints, the numerical simulations showed that: 1) information asymmetry should be minimized as much as possible during policy implementation; 2) reducing costs can accelerate self-convergence, but will not affect other participants; 3) the implementation of economic penalties can promote the evolution of the supervised party to evolutionary stability strategy; 4) improving the level of effort by farmers in implementing the policy is key to accelerating the evolution of the entire system.

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“…Reducing the cost of supervision increased the enthusiasm of government supervision, which further enhanced the effectiveness of supervision and enable shipping companies to reduce pollution emissions [9]. Of course, increased subsidies for companies to implement cleaner production would also enable companies to reduce pollutant emissions and choose cleaner production strategies [10,11]. Similarly, reducing the cost of government supervision would also strengthen the government supervision, which in turn would lead to a reduction in corporate pollution emissions [12].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Research between the Government Environmental Regulation Intensities and the Pollution Emissions of Papermaking Enterprises

Zhang

Qin

Ling

et al. 2021

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Environmental regulations of different intensities may have different impacts on polluting enterprises. The purpose of this article is to analyze how different environmental regulations affect the pollution discharge strategies of papermaking enterprises. By establishing an evolutionary game model between the government environmental regulation intensities and the pollutant emissions from papermaking enterprises, this thesis further solves the model and performs stability analysis and finally uses MATLAB to conduct simulation studies. And the researching results show that papermaking enterprises will take risks to choose the illegal pollutant discharge strategies when the illegal profits are large. Further analysis shows that the increase in the successful probability of the strong environmental regulations does not necessarily force papermaking enterprises to choose to comply with pollution discharge regulations. However, papermaking enterprises may choose to comply with discharge pollution regulations not only by increasing the successful probability of strong environmental regulations but also by increasing the rewards and punishments for papermaking enterprises as well as by increasing the probability of reporting violations of pollutants. Based on the above results, the author proposes several countermeasures, such as establishing a specialized pollution monitoring agency, encouraging third-party supervision, reporting pollution behaviors, and increasing penalties for polluting companies for violations. China is in a critical period of transition from rapid development to high-quality development. It will provide some reliable references for the construction of a green economy and an ecological economy that the characteristics and relationships between the intensity of government environmental regulations and corporate pollution emissions revealed in this article.

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Production Supervision Considering Limited Resources of the Enterprise

Cited by 10 publications

References 16 publications

Can Internet regulation encourage companies to produce low-carbon products? — The effective stability of Internet supervision and punishment mechanism

Can Internet regulation encourage companies to produce low-carbon products? — The effective stability of Internet supervision and punishment mechanism

Improvement of the Ecological Protection Compensation Policy for Adjustment of Planting Structure in an Area of Groundwater Overexploitation: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study

Evolutionary Game Research between the Government Environmental Regulation Intensities and the Pollution Emissions of Papermaking Enterprises

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