Evolutionary Game Analysis on Operation Mode Selection of Big-Science Infrastructures

Abstract

As big-science infrastructures (BSIs) become the new infrastructure to support the construction of strong science and technology in China, how to choose an operation mode that is more conducive to achieving the construction goals of BSIs has become a current focus issue. The existing literature focuses more on the governance relationship between BSIs and universities or research institutes, while the important role of government has not yet been thoroughly analyzed. This study argues that government plays a fundamental role in the selection of operation modes for BSIs. Therefore, this study builds an evolutionary game model between the government and the contractor based on the perspective of asset specificity by analyzing the practical basis for the strategic choices of the government and the contractor for the operation of BSIs. The model is numerically simulated and analyzed. The research results indicate that the government’s decisions on operation strategies, outsourcing strategies, and the combination of the two significantly affect the strategic choices of the contractor, thereby affecting whether the government can obtain the value of asset specificity of BSIs. The government’s choice of the “independent operation” strategy or the combination “dependent operation + controlled outsourcing” strategy is more conducive to encouraging the contractor to choose the “cooperation” strategy for producing specific value for BSIs. The main contribution of this study is to clarify that the allocation of the government control right is the key factor in obtaining the value of asset specificity of BSIs.