Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Subject Risk Management Behavior in Construction Stage of Engineering Project Based on Strong Reciprocity and Prospect Theory

Wang, Dan; Jia, Qingxuan; Zhang, Ruixue

doi:10.1109/access.2021.3080684

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…In terms of the study of the relationship between emergency subjects, the academic community is trying to explain the internal and external factors that affect the relationship interaction and strategy selection between emergency response organizations from the perspectives of reciprocity, reward, punishment, and third parties [41][42][43]. However, most existing studies regard relevant government departments with the same political intention and emergency target as a unified whole.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Liu

Song

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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To reveal the interaction and influence mechanism between emergency rescue entities, and to explore and optimize a cooperation mechanism of emergency rescue entities, a tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency rescue cooperation based on government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions was constructed. The stability of each game subject’s strategy choice was explored. Simulation analysis was applied to investigate the influence mechanism of key parameters on the evolution of the game subject’s strategy combination. The research results show that government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions have consistent political demands and rescue targets in emergency rescue cooperation. The game subjects are driving forces for each other to choose positive strategies. The game evolution process of the emergency cooperation model shows a “mobilization-coordination” feature. At the same time, the emergency capital stock formed based on trust relationships, information matching, and institutional norms between game subjects can promote the evolution of the game system toward (1,1,1). In addition, for government organizations with limited emergency resources, the average allocation of emergency resources is not the optimal solution for emergency rescue efficiency. However, it is easier to achieve the overall target of emergency rescue cooperation by investing limited emergency resources in key variables that match the on-site situation. On this basis, combined with the practice of emergency rescues in emergencies, countermeasures and solutions are proposed to optimize the mechanism and improve the efficiency of emergency rescue cooperation.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Liu

Song

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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show abstract

“…Kahneman et al [19] proposed a prospect theory with higher explanatory validity for behavioral decisions to further investigate the influence of decision makers' perception bias on decision behavior. Following that, a wide range of scholars [20][21][22] used prospect theory to further investigate and analyze decision behavior in various domains. Thale et al [23] proposed a psychological account theory based on prospect theory in a subsequent study, arguing that behavioral decisions occur after one's own comparison of gains and losses, further enriching the research basis of behavioral decisions.…”

Section: Introduction and Theoretical Assumptions 1introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Shared Manufacturing Quality Synergy under Dynamic Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Zhang

Wang

et al. 2022

Applied Sciences

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Quality improvement is crucial for manufacturing, and existing research has paid less attention to the influence of regulatory factors and irrational factors of decision makers. Considering the impact of the reward and punishment strategy of the shared platform on quality decision-making, this paper introduces prospect theory and mental account theory into the process of multi-agent evolutionary game of shared manufacturing, constructs a co-evolutionary game model of shared manufacturing quality synergistic improvement under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, and analyzes the dynamic evolution law of each game agent. The research results show that: (1) The synergistic improvement of shared manufacturing quality is the consequence of the combined action of numerous interrelated and interacting factors, rather than the linear effect of a single element. (2) Although the combination of multiple incentive and punishment methods can significantly alter the effect of shared manufacturing quality synergy, there are certain effectiveness gaps. (3) The subsidy mechanism can effectively compensate for the effectiveness gap of the reward and punishment mechanism, and it can also strengthen the internal driving force of shared manufacturing quality coordination. The main management insights are as follows: (1) Consider strong external regulation to be the framework constraint, and positive internal control to be the detail specification. (2) Create a reliable reward and punishment mechanism and dynamically alter the intensity of rewards and penalties. (3) To close the effectiveness gap, strengthen the subsidy mechanism as an essential addition to the incentive and punishment mechanisms. This study can give a new reference path for quality improvement of shared manufacturing, allowing shared manufacturing to play a more constructive role in supporting the transformation and development of the manufacturing industry.

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“…Simultaneously, workers are only penalized F if managers use a positive regulatory strategy. When workers comply with specifications, C 1 refers to their safe construction cost,

refers to their risk loss, while

refers to the risk loss of managers ( 53 ). After workers complete the construction safely and efficiently, they will receive subsidies S regardless of the strength of management supervision.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of construction workers' unsafe behavior: Considering incentive and risk loss

Huang

Yang

et al. 2022

Front. Public Health

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The behavior of construction workers has a significant impact on the overall safety climate of a project. The purpose of this paper is to figure out the evolutionary pattern of workers' unsafe behavior and to minimize its occurrence. We constructed a two-sided evolutionary game model consisting of workers and managers to explore the focal point of interest, strategy equilibrium conditions, and behavior evolution process. The experimental results of stability analysis and system dynamics show that there are two stable states in all four cases, (Safe behavior, Negative management) as well as (Unsafe behavior, Negative management). The lower the initial willingness of workers to behave unsafely, the faster they reach a safe steady state. By contrast, managers' strategy choices have a certain lag. Workers are discouraged from choosing unsafe behavior under both the positive incentive of raising bonuses and the negative incentive of raising fines. And the sensitivity of the two incentives is similar. For indirect effect risk loss, when it is effectively controlled during safe construction, workers quickly gravitate toward safe behavior. These findings provide a reference for construction safety management. Several practical suggestions were proposed from three perspectives: the worker, the manager, and the site safety climate, focus on the theme of reducing unsafe behavior and achieving a virtuous cycle of safety climate.

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Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Subject Risk Management Behavior in Construction Stage of Engineering Project Based on Strong Reciprocity and Prospect Theory

Cited by 14 publications

References 36 publications

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Shared Manufacturing Quality Synergy under Dynamic Reward and Punishment Mechanism

An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of construction workers' unsafe behavior: Considering incentive and risk loss

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