Evolutionary game dynamics of Moran process with fuzzy payoffs and its application

Gu, Cuiling; Wang, Xianjia; Zhao, Jinhua; Ding, Rui; He, Qilong

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2020.125227

Cited by 17 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…The evolutionary game of finite groups is widely used in sociology, economics, management, and other fields. For example, it is used to predict how strategies in the player group evolve ( 24 ), and how to promote polluting enterprises to deal with emissions ( 25 ). The Moran process can promote cooperation between enterprises ( 26 ), and when the strength of selection among groups is strong enough, cooperation can be sustained ( 27 ).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pharmaceutical enterprises drug quality strategy Moran analysis considering government supervision and new media participation

Zhu²

2023

Front. Public Health

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The improvement of drug quality requires not only the supervision of government, but also the participation of new media. Therefore, this paper considers the impact of government regulation and new media reports on pharmaceutical enterprises, constructs a Moran Process evolutionary game model, and analyzes the evolution trajectory of pharmaceutical enterprises' choice of drug quality improvement strategy and drug cost reduction strategy. We obtain the conditions for the two strategies to achieve evolutionary stability under the dominance of external factors and the dominance of expected returns. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by the software MATLAB 2021b. The results show that, first of all, when the government penalty is high, the drug quality improvement strategy tends to become an evolutionary stable solution, increasing the penalty amount will help promote the improvement of drug quality. What's more, when the government penalty is low and the new media influence is low, the drug cost reduction strategy is easier to dominate. The higher the new media influence, the higher the probability that pharmaceutical enterprises choose the drug quality improvement strategy. Thirdly, when the number of pharmaceutical enterprises is lower than a threshold, the drug quality improvement strategy is easier to dominate. Finally, the drug quality improvement strategy is dominant when the quality cost factor is low and the government penalty is high, the drug cost reduction strategy is dominant when the quality cost factor is high and the government penalty is low. Above all, this paper provides countermeasures and suggestions for the drug quality improvement of pharmaceutical enterprises in practice.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pharmaceutical enterprises drug quality strategy Moran analysis considering government supervision and new media participation

Zhu²

2023

Front. Public Health

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“…Any proportion of cooperation can be sustained [ 24 ]. Evolutionary game theory about finite groups is widely used in sociology, economics, management, etc., for example, by building the Moran process game to predict strategies that evolve in groups of players [ 25 ], studying the results of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics combining imitation update rules and average payoff-driven update rules [ 26 ], and solving the problem of strategy choice for interaction among polluting enterprises [ 27 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pharmaceutical Enterprises’ R&D Innovation Cooperation Moran Strategy When Considering Tax Incentives

Zhu

2022

IJERPH

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Drug R&D innovation contributes to the high-quality development of the pharmaceutical industry, which is related to people’s life and health, economic development, and social stability. Tax incentives and industry cooperation are conducive to promoting pharmaceutical enterprises’ innovation. Therefore, this paper constructs a Moran process evolutionary game model and analyzes the evolutionary trajectory of N pharmaceutical enterprises’ drug R&D innovation strategic choice and considers the choice of R&D innovation strategy and non-R&D innovation strategy. We obtain the conditions for the two strategies to achieve evolutionary stability under the dominance of external factors, the dominance of expected revenue, and the dominance of super expected revenue. The evolutionary process is simulated by MATLAB 2021b. The results show that, firstly, when the number of pharmaceutical enterprises is higher than a threshold, the market is conducive to pharmaceutical enterprises choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Secondly, the higher the tax incentives, the higher the probability of pharmaceutical enterprises choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Thirdly, when the R&D success rate increases, pharmaceutical enterprises gradually change from choosing a non-R&D innovation strategy to choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Fourthly, the threshold of strategy change of pharmaceutical enterprises is the same under the dominance of expected revenue and super expected revenue. This paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for promoting the R&D innovation of pharmaceutical enterprises in practice.

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“…Significantly, the evolutionary equilibrium strategies among participants are always the results of learning and adjustment rather than one-shot game results; the game allows for errors and allows participants to learn from previous errors to reach stable state strategies [25,26]. us, EGT is generally used to study the long-term stable strategy choice of participants [27,28].…”

Section: Evolutionary Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

Yang²

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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In a market with intense competition, cost pressures tempt enterprises to seek profits in ways that infringe on the interests of consumers. This is especially true when market sentiment is weak. In such situations, governments play a vital role in protecting consumers’ interests and helping struggling enterprises. We construct a tripartite game model that includes the government, enterprises, and consumers under a subsidy and punishment mechanism. We use this model to investigate the strategic choices made by the participants in an evolutionary game theory (EGT) framework. We present four stable equilibrium points as pure strategy solutions with the aid of a replicator dynamic system. Three main findings are presented in this paper. First, not all equilibrium points can be evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) when considering the potential motivations of the participants to change strategies. Second, there is an equilibrium point that satisfies the stability condition but changes periodically in its strategy space; strategy changes between participants are not synchronized. Third, the government prefers to subsidize enterprises when enterprise speculation is serious or when enterprise investment in improving production technology is high.

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Evolutionary game dynamics of Moran process with fuzzy payoffs and its application

Cited by 17 publications

References 41 publications

Pharmaceutical enterprises drug quality strategy Moran analysis considering government supervision and new media participation

Pharmaceutical enterprises drug quality strategy Moran analysis considering government supervision and new media participation

Pharmaceutical Enterprises’ R&D Innovation Cooperation Moran Strategy When Considering Tax Incentives

Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

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