Evolutionary Game Model of Internal Threats to Nuclear Security in Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plants Based on RDEU Theory

Abstract

The internal threat to nuclear security is one of the most serious problems in the physical protection supervision of spent fuel reprocessing plants. Both insiders and nuclear security departments have obvious characteristics of situational decision making and even irrational decision making. Combined with Game theory and RDEU theory, the RDEU Game model of insiders and nuclear security departments was constructed to analyze the existence of equilibrium solutions of two-way strategies under different emotional states. From a dynamic point of view, the influence and change process of emotion on participants’ decision-making behavior were analyzed. Then, the model was numerically simulated to verify its accuracy and effectiveness, which showed that different emotional states and intensities would not only affect the final result of evolutionary equilibrium, but also change the evolution speed of the strategies. In addition, compared with insiders, the intensity of pessimism in the nuclear security department had a greater impact on the game equilibrium. Finally, we present some reasonable recommendations to prevent and protect nuclear security events at spent fuel reprocessing plants by strengthening the emotional supervision and guidance of insiders and the nuclear security department.

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