Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory

Abstract

Based on the prospect theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of government and construction units for the problem of poor subsidy construction of government-subsidized construction units and uses the replication dynamic equation to analyse the strategic choice of evolutionary games. The research shows that the evolutionary game system of the construction unit and the government cannot meet the government incentives, and the construction unit also adopts the stable state of the prefabricated building. In the long run, the government subsidy cannot determine whether or not the construction unit will adopt the prefabricated building, and it is the construction cost of the prefabricated building that determines. Therefore, the government's work should shift from subsidies to targeted incentives forconstruction units to reduce the cost of construction of prefabricated buildings. The unit levies an environmental tax and appropriately restricts the income from the traditional cast-in-place construction units, and, on the other hand, it increases the popularization of low-carbon and environmental protection of the fabricated buildings, so that more consumers can recognize the environmental benefits brought by the assembled buildings. It provides a reference for the government to promote the development of prefabricated buildings.

Government Low‐Carbon Policies Optimization for Smart Transportation Enterprises

“…e governments and enterprises are limited rationality, have certain learning abilities and evolution, and behave independently [51][52][53][54][55].…”

An Analysis on Promoting Prefabrication Implementation in Construction Industry towards Sustainability

“…The aspects of non-economic incentives mainly involved benefits in transportation, reputation, and the approval process [131,154]. Although government incentives could promote the development of prefabricated construction to a certain extent in the initial stage, in the long run, it was the construction cost rather than government incentives that could determine whether companies employ prefabrication in the projects [155].…”

Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit

“…It believes that people's decisions and choices depend on the difference between results and expectations rather than the results themselves. Because it measures the value of prospects under dynamic uncertain conditions, it is more in line with people's decision-making behavior in real situations [30]. e combination of prospect theory and evolutionary games has been used in the research of actors in the fields of financial supervision [31], construction waste recycling [11], and prefabricated buildings [30].…”

“…Because it measures the value of prospects under dynamic uncertain conditions, it is more in line with people's decision-making behavior in real situations [30]. e combination of prospect theory and evolutionary games has been used in the research of actors in the fields of financial supervision [31], construction waste recycling [11], and prefabricated buildings [30]. Green retrofitting projects are one of the most complex and risky types of projects, because there are relatively more stakeholders involved [9].…”