Evolutionary game theory analysis for understanding the decision-making mechanisms of governments and developers on green building incentives

Fan, Kefeng; Hui, Eddie C.M.

doi:10.1016/j.buildenv.2020.106972

Cited by 99 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…In the construction industry, existing researches used evolutionary games to study the quantitative effects of incentive policies for the promotion of green buildings, the green retrofits of buildings, etc. [ 10 , 11 ]. The government and developers or contractors are usually selected as game players.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Their behaviors are dynamically evolving, and they continue to learn, compete and adapt. Existing literature gradually apply this dynamic and systematic method to the exploration of incentive mechanisms for the development of green buildings [ 10 , 11 ]. Studies with LCBs as the research object, considering the impact of carbon tax policy on the low carbon behavior of construction enterprises and consumers, have done little.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

Yan

Huang

et al. 2021

IJERPH

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The development of low-carbon buildings (LCBs) in China has not reached its expected status, although the Chinese government has formulated many relevant regulations. The real estate developers and consumers are essential participants in the development of LCBs. This paper explores whether the government’s implementation of the carbon tax will change their choices of LCBs. Evolutionary game models between developers and consumers are established under static and dynamic carbon taxes. Their evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are deduced in different situations. According to the real scenarios in China, numerical simulations are further conducted to show that carbon tax influences the low-carbon behaviors of stakeholders in the construction industry. Under a static carbon tax, the two players cannot reach an equilibrium state, while the game system is stable under a dynamic tax. The probability of the developers constructing LCBs is positively related to the carbon tax, while its degree is gradually weakened as the tax rate increases. Therefore, an appropriate tax should be set to promote the development of LCBs effectively. Finally, policy implications are put forwarded to guide the participants’ low-carbon behaviors and reduce the carbon emissions in the Chinese construction industry.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

Yan

Huang

et al. 2021

IJERPH

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show abstract

“…In this way, the game environment can be restored more comprehensively and accurately, and conclusions can be drawn more accurately. In addition, different from classical game theory, evolutionary game players constantly observe and imitate each other in the process of interaction, so as to optimize the strategy [ 53 ]. Furthermore, the difference in GDP and the government’s reward–penalty mechanism can lead to different strategies.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Theory Study for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Considering Green Development Performance under the Chinese Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism

Long

Liu

et al. 2020

IJERPH

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The low efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain in construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling has restricted the green development of China’s construction industry. Additionally, the government’s reward–penalty mechanism has a huge influence on green development. This study aimed to investigate the effect of green development performance (GDP) and the government’s reward–penalty mechanism on the decision-making process of production and recycling units, as well as to reveal the optimal strategies under different conditions. Therefore, the strategies’ evolutionary paths of production and recycling units were investigated by using evolutionary game theory. Firstly, an evolutionary game model between production units and recycling units was proposed under the government’s reward–penalty mechanism. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies in different scenarios were discussed. Finally, the effects of the relevant parameters on the evolutionary paths of the game model were analyzed using numerical simulations. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) When the range of GDP changes, the evolutionary stable strategy changes accordingly. GDP plays a positive role in promoting the high-quality development of the CDW recycling supply chain, but an increase in GDP can easily lead to the simultaneous motivation of free-riding. (2) The government’s reward–penalty mechanism effectively regulates the decision-making process of production and recycling units. An increase in the subsidy rate and supervision probability helps to reduce free-riding behavior. Moreover, the incentive effect of the subsidy probability on recycling units is more obvious, while the effect of the supervision probability on improving the motivation of active participation for production units is more remarkable. This paper not only provides a decision-making basis to ensure production and recycling units to make optimal strategy choices under different conditions but also provides a reference for the government to formulate a reasonable reward–penalty mechanism that is conducive to a macro-control market.

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“…They concluded that the real variables of the situation have an impact on organizations and become "especially vulnerable to certain logics and less so to others" (Abdullah, et al 2017) competing ILs in a Swedish football organization and observed the situation-specific aspect of the manner in which corporate and sports ILs merge decision-making in specific situations. Other accounting researchers investigated how competing ILs communicate with other situations/contexts (Fan & Hui, 2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The balanced scorecard's evolution as a strategic mechanism at banking sectors

Ali¹,

Anwar²

2021

IJELS

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As the current study has an empirical and impartial nature, a quantitative method was considered the best method for achieving the research objectives of the study. A quantitative technique applied in order to analyze the current study. Sample design refers to the procedure or method the researcher is willing to accept in choosing items for the sample. Research sample was selected using a procedure of random sampling and it was carried out in different banks. A total of 140 questionnaires were distributed, however 128 participants properly filled out the questionnaires. The study applied multiple regression analysis to measure the current study. The results show that internal process as balanced scored card has significant positive influence on strategic mechanism at 5% level. The results show that internal process as balanced scored card has significant positive influence on strategic mechanism at 5% level. The results show that organizational capacity as balanced scored card has significant positive influence on strategic mechanism at 5% level. The results show that customer as balanced scored card has significant positive influence on strategic mechanism at 5% level. Moreover, all beta value is higher than .001. The results show that nonfinancial incentives have a better impact on employee success because they encourage them to be more environmentally conscious. As a result, it is proposed that, in order to ensure environmental protection, nonfinancial initiatives be used in accordance with financial measures to enhance internal company processes. For example, rather than conventional initiatives that would persuade sustainable change, it is recommended that measures related to waste and utilization of specific resources be taken. The methodological results further highlight the importance of learning and development as a constant phase rather than a seasonal operation.

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Evolutionary game theory analysis for understanding the decision-making mechanisms of governments and developers on green building incentives

Cited by 99 publications

References 31 publications

Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

An Evolutionary Game Theory Study for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Considering Green Development Performance under the Chinese Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism

The balanced scorecard's evolution as a strategic mechanism at banking sectors

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