Evolutionary minority game with heterogeneous strategy distribution

Lo, T. S.; Lim, S. W.; Hui, P. M.; Johnson, Neil F.

doi:10.1016/s0378-4371(00)00444-1

Cited by 24 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…In fact, the main motivation for the introduction of time-dependent random walks in [13] was its applicability in the flourishing field of complex adaptive systems. In the well-studied model of the minority game (MG) [14], and its evolutionary version (EMG) [15] (see also [16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28]), it was found that the winning probabilities of the agents display a periodic behavior in time. This implies that the survival probabilities of the agents are well-described by a model of a periodic time-dependent random walk with an absorbing boundary [13].…”

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confidence: 99%

Survival probabilities in time-dependent random walks

Nakar

Hod

2004

Phys. Rev. E

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We analyze the dynamics of random walks in which the jumping probabilities are periodic timedependent functions. In particular, we determine the survival probability of biased walkers who are drifted towards an absorbing boundary. The typical life-time of the walkers is found to decrease with an increment of the oscillation amplitude of the jumping probabilities. We discuss the applicability of the results in the context of complex adaptive systems.

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confidence: 99%

Survival probabilities in time-dependent random walks

Nakar

Hod

2004

Phys. Rev. E

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“…The Genetic Model represents an abstract model of a population competing for a limited resource and as such it often discussed in the context of financial markets [3,4,8,9,12,13,26]. In such a context, however, it does not seem realistic that the agents trade at every time step.…”

Section: B the Grand Canonical Genetic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Memory and self-induced shocks in an evolutionary population competing for limited resources

Kay

Johnson²

2004

Phys. Rev. E

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We present a detailed discussion of the role played by memory, and the nature of self-induced shocks, in an evolutionary population competing for limited resources. Our study builds on a previously introduced multi-agent system [Phys. Rev. Lett 82, 3360 (1999)] which has attracted significant attention in the literature. This system exhibits self-segregation of the population based on the 'gene' value p (where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1), transitions to 'frozen' populations as a function of the global resource level, and self-induced large changes which spontaneously arise as the dynamical system evolves. We find that the large, macroscopic self-induced shocks which arise, are controlled by microscopic changes within extreme subgroups of the population (i.e. subgroups with 'gene' values p ∼ 0 and p ∼ 1).

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“…[4,5,6] Thus, in order to succeed in a competitive society the agent must take extreme positions. This behavior can be explained by the market impact of the agents' own actions which largely penalizes the cautious agents.…”

Section: Phenomenology Of the Evolutionary Minority Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Theory of the Three-Group Evolutionary Minority Game

Chen

Wang

Yuan

2004

Int. J. Mod. Phys. B

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Based on the adiabatic theory for the evolutionary minority game (EMG) that we proposed earlier[1], we perform a detail analysis of the EMG limited to three groups of agents. We derive a formula for the critical point of the transition from segregation (into opposing groups) to clustering (towards cautious behaviors). Particular to the three-group EMG, the strategy switching in the "extreme" group does not occur at every losing step and is strongly intermittent. This leads to an correction to the critical value of the number of agents at the transition, Nc. Our expression for Nc is in agreement with the results obtained from our numerical simulations.

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Evolutionary minority game with heterogeneous strategy distribution

Cited by 24 publications

References 19 publications

Survival probabilities in time-dependent random walks

Survival probabilities in time-dependent random walks

Memory and self-induced shocks in an evolutionary population competing for limited resources

Theory of the Three-Group Evolutionary Minority Game

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