Examining Explanations for Nuclear Proliferation

Bell, Mark S.

doi:10.1093/isq/sqv007

Cited by 34 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…Researchers have employed EBA to assess the sensitivity of the determinants of civil war (Hegre and Sambanis 2006), coups d'état (Gassebner et al 2016), democratisation (Gassebner et al 2013), economic growth (Levine and Renelt 1992;Sala-i-Martin 1997), nuclear deterrence (Bell 2015), and political repression (Hafner-Burton 2005). The method is particularly useful when there is no consensus about which covariates belong in the "true" regression model (Sala-i-Martin 1997, 178) and scholars worry that omitted or unnecessary predictors can bias the model estimates (Angrist and Pischke 2008;Clarke 2005;Elwert and Winship 2014;Spector and Brannick 2011, 60).…”

Section: Extreme Bounds Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A VIF of 1 indicates that the predictor is uncorrelated with the remaining covariates. VIF limits are often arbitrary (Bell 2015;O'Brien 2007), thus here we use a moderately conservative VIF of 7. As robustness tests, we run the same models without restriction and with different cut-offs.…”

Section: Extreme Bounds Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For discussion on these important differences in conceptualisation see (Straus 2007;Finkel and Straus 2012) inants of state-sponsored atrocities. Our approach is similar to Hegre and Sambanis (2006) seminal analysis on the causes of civil war onset, but we provide additional tests to verify whether complex interactions and nonlinearities are driving the statistical results (Bell 2015;Jones and Linder 2015;Jones and Lupu 2018;Muchlinski et al 2015). In conducting this analysis, we address three debates in the mass violence literature:…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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What Drives State-Sponsored Violence?: Evidence from Extreme Bounds Analysis and Ensemble Learning Models

Freire¹,

Uzonyi²

2018

Preprint

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Section: Extreme Bounds Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Extreme Bounds Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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What Drives State-Sponsored Violence?: Evidence from Extreme Bounds Analysis and Ensemble Learning Models

Freire¹,

Uzonyi²

2018

Preprint

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“…Methodologically, nuclear proliferation is essentially a medium-N problem. Few states even consider acquiring nuclear weapons, complicating statistical inferences, with different models producing competing results (Bleek 2010, Bell 2016. Furthermore, correlation does not establish causation.…”

Section: Third Wave: Supply Constraints On Nuclear Weaponsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict and Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation

Debs

Monteiro

2017

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

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This article critically reviews scholarship on the role of conflict and cooperation in conditioning nuclear proliferation. We start by laying out the trajectory of scholarship on the causes of proliferation, organizing it in three waves: (a) security and (b) nonsecurity drivers of proliferation, and (c) supply constraints on nuclear acquisition. We then examine the recent turn in the proliferation literature toward a strategic interaction approach, focusing on how conflict and cooperation between proliferators, their adversaries, and their allies shape the spread of nuclear weapons. We argue for an integrated framework for analyzing the tools states can deploy to foster or stymie proliferation. Finally, we sketch an agenda for research on nuclear proliferation. Here, we argue that scholarship should (a) incorporate nonsecurity dynamics into the strategic interaction approach to the study of proliferation and (b) combine rigorous theory with careful historical research to further our understanding of the causes of proliferation.

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“… 19 For other uses in adjacent research questions, see Hegre & Sambanis (2006), Bapat et al (2013), and Bell (2015). …”

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confidence: 99%

Does counterterrorism militarize foreign aid? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa

Heinrich

Machain

Oestman

2017

Journal of Peace Research

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This article studies whether the pursuit of counterterrorism militarizes foreign aid flows. It focuses on the case of US foreign aid to sub-Saharan African states, which recently have experienced an increase in the presence of al-Qaeda or its affiliate terrorist organizations. This article argues that as terrorist groups carry out attacks inside a state’s territory, aid towards that state will serve such counterterrorism goals. For one, the state’s executive branch will receive increased military aid to immediately fight al-Qaeda or affiliates. For the other, the United States also steps up aid for civil society and development, which could over time undermine al-Qaeda’s mobilization and recruitment efforts. In an empirical analysis that covers 46 African states from 1996 to 2011, our results largely corroborate the hypothesized patterns for attacks that occur on a country territory and in the neighborhood. We note, though, that the overall composition of aid shifts relative to the military when there are direct attacks, something that does not occur when attacks happen in the neighborhood only. Our article concludes that concerns about militarization of aid are warranted, but that actual manifestations are nuanced.

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Examining Explanations for Nuclear Proliferation

Cited by 34 publications

References 63 publications

What Drives State-Sponsored Violence?: Evidence from Extreme Bounds Analysis and Ensemble Learning Models

What Drives State-Sponsored Violence?: Evidence from Extreme Bounds Analysis and Ensemble Learning Models

Conflict and Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation

Does counterterrorism militarize foreign aid? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa

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