Examining Israel's NPT Exceptionality: 1998–2005

Abstract

Israel's exceptional status as a nonsignatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been an increasingly salient issue, particularly during the intense debate over universality in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and again following the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998. This analysis argues that despite these events, Israel's diplomatic position has not weakened significantly in the past decade. The factors that have led to this outcome include changes in the political and strategic environment, including the Iraqi and Iranian NPT violations, and Israeli engagement in different fora such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the United Nations, and in bilateral strategic dialogues with key powers. This report examines whether Israel's exceptional status is likely to be maintained in the face of recent developments in Iran and the precedent set by the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement.For many years, Israel's status as a nonsignatory to the 1970 Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been a major source of controversy in international discussions of the nonproliferation regime. The centrality of this topic and the debate over the doctrine of universality were highlighted during the buildup to and during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, increasing the salience of Israeli NPT exceptionality. 1 In 1998, the decision by the other two NPT nonsignatory states * India and Pakistan *to conduct tests and openly declare themselves to be nuclear powers established Israel's singular position. In the meetings of the preparatory committee (PrepCom) and 2000 Review Conference (RevCon) that followed, this exceptionality was highlighted, parallel to efforts led by Egypt to press Israel to alter its policy. And in the 2005 RevCon, which ended without a final document, Israel's status was again among the major issues of contention, although this time the debate over Iran's nuclear ambitions was also central. 2 As part of an ongoing project to examine the diplomatic history of Israeli policies with respect to the NPT and the nonproliferation regime (as distinct from the strategic histories that have been published), this report focuses on developments between the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998 and the 2005 RevCon. In this analysis, the changes in the political and strategic environment, and the progress (or its absence) of efforts to press Israel on this issue will be considered in detail, followed by an analysis of the explanatory factors and the prognosis for the next few years. The impact of efforts, first by Iraq and then by Iran, to obtain nuclear weapons and the response of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the nonproliferation regime will be considered, and the view that these developments have shifted some of the focus away from Israel, or perhaps increased it through claims of ''double standards,'' will be examined.The Israeli government's responses to comments and decisions made in the NPT framework and their impact...