Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union institutions

Bouwen, Pieter

doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00157.x

Cited by 320 publications

(280 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Furthermore, lobbying is the accepted and expected form of interest intermediation at the EU level (Daviter 2011 ;Peters 2001 ). Authors agree that success at this level depends on skillful use of all available resources (Bouwen 2004 ;Chalmers 2011 ;Peters 2001 ). Because of the fluidity of the institutions and the absence of a central EU authority, groups are empowered to use their skills more effectively (Zahariadis 2008 , p. 527).…”

Section: Politics Streammentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When looking in particular at the European Union's supranational structure, Bouwen ( 2002Bouwen ( , 2004 argues that the type of feedback that groups produce is the most important resource at their disposal to gain access to different policymakers. The policy officials in the European Commission (CEC) are most interested in expertise and technical know-how related to understanding the market and public demands; the members of European Parliament (EP) seek knowledge on aggregated needs and interests in the European economic arena; and the Council's members look for information on the aggregated needs and interests of specific domestic sectors.…”

Section: Problem Streammentioning

confidence: 99%

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Interest groups in multiple streams: specifying their involvement in the framework

Rozbicka

Spohr

2015

Policy Sci

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Although interests inhabit a central place in the multiple streams framework (MSF), interest groups have played only a minor role in theoretical and empirical studies until now. In Kingdon's original conception, organized interests are a key variable in the politics stream. Revisiting Kingdon's concept with a particular focus on interest groups and their activities-in different streams and at various levels-in the policy process, we take this argument further. In particular, we argue that specifying groups' roles in other streams adds value to the explanatory power of the framework. To do this, we look at how interest groups affect problems, policies, and politics. The influence of interest groups within the streams is explained by linking the MSF with literature on interest intermediation. We show that depending on the number of conditions and their activity level, interest groups can be involved in all three streams. We illustrate this in case studies reviewing labor market policies in Germany and chemicals regulation at the European level.

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Section: Politics Streammentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Problem Streammentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest groups in multiple streams: specifying their involvement in the framework

Rozbicka

Spohr

2015

Policy Sci

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“…Some point to the emergence of elite pluralism, defined by Coen (1997, pages 98-99) as an institutional arrangement where "access is generally restricted to a few policy players, for whom membership is competitive and strategically advisable." Information and network relationships have been extensively discussed as important resources for gaining access to EU policy makers in the system of elite pluralism (eg, Bernhagen and Bräuninger, 2005;Bouwen, 2004;Klüver, 2012). Indeed, elite pluralism involves a resource dependency between policy officials and lobbyists, which incentivises lobbyists to use their technical expertise and know-how as a means of accessing policy officials in the EU's closed decision-making arenas (eg, Bouwen, 2004).…”

Section: Exposure To Institutional Pressuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring Corporate Lobbyists' Perceptions of Prospective Coalition Partners in Brussels

Barron

Hultén

2014

Environ Plann C Gov Policy

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Abstract. Using original data from a survey conducted in 2012, we apply theoretical insights from the literature on strategic alliances to explore Brussels-based corporate lobbyists' perceptions of prospective political partners. We find these perceptions to be driven primarily by strategic considerations. We also uncover instances where the size and nationality of respondents' firms influence their partner evaluations. Surprisingly, we find little evidence that respondents' assessments of lobbying partners are shaped by EU institutional arrangements. Whilst extant literature suggests information and relationships are important preconditions for successful EU lobbying, we expose the specific circumstances when seeking access to these-and other political resources-that can influence corporate lobbyists' perceptions of their partners. Combined, our findings respond to a concern that scholars of interest coalitions focus on why firms lobby in coalitions whilst overlooking how they select their lobbying partners.

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“…Interest groups thus have an incentive to formulate their demands in constructive terms that do not inhibit problem-solving situations, especially when they are participating in early stages of the agenda-setting process in consultations with the European Commission (for discussion He´ritier, 1999;Bouwen, 2004). As interest groups cannot rely on electoral pressure to insure that they will be heard, they have to adapt to the institutional objectives of their counterparts.…”

Section: The Nature Of the Political Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison

Woll

2012

Int Groups Adv

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Executive Summary Lobbying on both sides of the Atlantic has experienced a considerable boom in the last 50 years and one could be led to believe that the two industries look increasingly alike. Lobbyists have become highly professionalized and master a multitude of venues and levels of political authority. Direct representation of companies or other stakeholders co-exists with associational representation in both Washington DC and Brussels, even though peak associations play a greater role in Europe. The use of some instruments is different, however, in particular financial contributions and legal tactics, which are central in the United States (US) and much less common in the European Union (EU). What is more, observers of lobbying in the US and the EU have noted the markedly different lobbying styles: frequently aggressive advocacy approach in the US and a more consensus-oriented informational lobbying in the EU. While US groups and lobbyists oftentimes defend their immediate interest by trying to exert pressure on public officials, EU representatives seem to be more soft-spoken in their approach and are said to work in a more constructive manner with bureaucratic and political representatives. After developing a description of what makes up the respective styles, this article discusses cultural and institutional explanations cited in the literature. Rather than seeing lobbying styles as culture traits, it discusses the institutional constraints affecting lobbying behavior. In particular, the passage rate of proposals, the fragmentation of public media, the electoral structure and the transparency of political negotiations create different incentive structures in the US and the EU. However, lobbying styles are more than the cumulative effect of these different elements. They are linked to the nature of the political system, of which the institutional constraints are a reflection. The US, a fully established federal system, relies on majority decision-making. This creates an adversarial culture and 'winner-takes-all-politics'. The EU, by contrast, functions as a complex intergovernmental system with a high degree of supranational centralization. The resulting tension between integration and inter-state bargaining creates a system that relies on consensus-building. In this context, the access of private actors to supranational institutions depends on their contribution to the creation of problem-solving policy approaches. As long as the EU has to rely on the acceptance of its policy outputs for its legitimacy, we are bound to find many individual r

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Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union institutions

Cited by 320 publications

References 30 publications

Interest groups in multiple streams: specifying their involvement in the framework

Interest groups in multiple streams: specifying their involvement in the framework

Exploring Corporate Lobbyists' Perceptions of Prospective Coalition Partners in Brussels

The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison

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