Exclusion and regulatory intervention in investment sharing agreements

Ribeiro, Vitor Miguel

doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2016.07.002

Cited by 6 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Banerjee and Lin [46] first discussed the theoretical framework of vertical R&D cooperation in supply chains along with the R&D investment-sharing mechanism. Investment-sharing agreements will rapidly promote innovative technologies, dissemination, and coverage and reduce entry barriers and mitigate investment risk [47]. Investment-sharing contracts can always encourage the green supply chain coordination in innovation-intensive industries effectively.…”

Section: Wholesale Price Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit Seeking versus Survival Seeking: Green Investment of Capital-Constrained Suppliers with Incentive Contracts

Xia

Zhang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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This study explores a supply chain with a capital-constrained startup supplier who invests in product greenness and a manufacturer who sells green products to consumers under demand uncertainty. Green investment of the supplier is supported by the manufacturer with two incentive contracts: (i) investment- and (ii) revenue-sharing contracts. Profit- and survival-seeking objectives are considered for the startup supplier. Results show that the profit-seeking supplier increases its product greenness if demand uncertainty rises, whereas the survival-seeking supplier increases its product greenness if its capital constraints increase. Compared with the commonly used wholesale price contract, investment- and revenue-sharing contracts can help facilitate the “win-win” supply chain cooperation for improving product greenness. If the profit-seeking supplier cooperates with the manufacturer, the investment-sharing contract is preferred as the demand uncertainty increases. If a survival-seeking supplier cooperates with the manufacturer, the revenue-sharing contract is preferred as the capital constraint increases. Overall, the revenue-sharing contract is preferred given the high attractiveness of the green investment. By extending the discussion into two periods, the revenue-sharing contract will be preferred in the survival-seeking case because the cooperation can continue in a large parameter space.

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Section: Wholesale Price Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit Seeking versus Survival Seeking: Green Investment of Capital-Constrained Suppliers with Incentive Contracts

Xia

Zhang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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“…It is considered that the investment-sharing contract could help innovative technology increase speed, dissemination and coverage, reduce entry barriers and mitigate investment risk [40]. Investment-sharing contracts are widely used to coordinate the innovation-intensive industries effectively [41].…”

Section: Investment-sharing Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sustainable Cooperation in the Green Supply Chain under Financial Constraints

2019

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Investment on product greenness in green supply chain is always restricted by the emerging supplier’ financial constraints, so manufacturers always share the suppliers’ investment to encourage the suppliers’ green innovation. Based on the two-stage cooperation model between one manufacturer and one emerging supplier, and the assumption that emerging suppliers need to reach a certain survival threshold at the end of each period, this paper studies investment on product greenness and sustainability of cooperation in the supply chain. The impacts of consumers’ preference for greenness (CPG), market volatility, financial constraints, and investment-sharing proportion are also examined. It was found that when market volatility and CPG exist at the same time, compared with the deterministic environment, emerging suppliers will improve (or reduce) the wholesale price and greenness at the same time to balance the short-term bankruptcy risk and the long-term profit, and suppliers’ green investment would be stimulated by the increasing demand uncertainty. Besides, when suppliers’ financial constraints increase, manufacturers will also increase its sharing proportion of green investment. Lastly, there always exists an investment-sharing proportion that optimizes the sustainability of cooperation and profits jointly.

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“…Some researchers also examine broadband network sharing (or investment sharing for deploying new broadband networks). Ribeiro uses economic models with three and four operators to study how the exclusion of outsiders by members of investment sharing agreements affects the competitive nature of the market and justifies regulatory intervention in wholesale access prices to improve social welfare.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing the Economic Effects of Past Mobile Network Sharing Deals for Future Network Deployment

Kim¹,

Kim²,

Zo³

2018

ETRI Journal

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The increase in data traffic calls for investment in mobile networks; however, the saturating revenue of mobile broadband and increasing capital expenditure are discouraging mobile operators from investing in next-generation mobile networks. Mobile network sharing is a viable solution for operators and regulators to resolve this dilemma. This research uses a difference-in-differences analysis of 33 operators (including 11 control operators) to empirically evaluate the cost reduction effect of mobile network sharing. The results indicate a reduction in overall operating expenditure and short-term capital expenditure by national roaming. This finding implies that future technology and standards development should focus on flexible network operation and maintenance, energy efficiency, and maximizing economies of scale in radio access networks. Furthermore, mobile network sharing will become more viable and relevant in a 5G network deployment as spectrum bands are likely to increase the total cost of ownership of mobile networks and technical enablers will facilitate network sharing.

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Exclusion and regulatory intervention in investment sharing agreements

Cited by 6 publications

References 10 publications

Profit Seeking versus Survival Seeking: Green Investment of Capital-Constrained Suppliers with Incentive Contracts

Profit Seeking versus Survival Seeking: Green Investment of Capital-Constrained Suppliers with Incentive Contracts

Sustainable Cooperation in the Green Supply Chain under Financial Constraints

Analyzing the Economic Effects of Past Mobile Network Sharing Deals for Future Network Deployment

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