Executive board members’ remuneration: A longitudinal study

Abstract

Remuneration is considered to be closely connected with financial performance (positively), firm size (positively), the organizational structure (negatively) and corporate governance mechanisms (negatively). Furthermore, a connection of ownership structure and executives’ remuneration has been well established (theoretically and empirically) in the literature (agency theory). The paper examines if these relationships are valid in Greece. Greece hasn’t the characteristics of an Anglo-Saxon country. Overall the study has shown that remuneration levels in Greece are defined by a different set of factors than the ones that are prominent in an Aglo-Saxon country. Notably, fundamental financial measures of performance are more widely used. The age of firms and corporate governance quality have a catalytic impact on remuneration levels.

The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Ceo Compensation

“…This means that Tobin's q variable has a positive and insignificant relationship on CEO compensation. This is supported by the research of Darmadi (2011), and Lazarides et al (2008) who found a positive and insignificant relationship between Tobin's q and CEO's compensation. According to Darmadi (2011) and Lazariders et al (2008), this shows that there is no relationship between stock premiums and the level of compensation received by the CEO.…”

“…This means that the variable return on assets has a significant positive relationship with CEO compensation. This is supported by the study of Jian et al (2015), Cai et al (2011), Jaiswall & Bhattacharyya (2016), Lazarides et al (2008), and Iqbal and Shehzad (2010) stated that return on assets has a significant positive relationship on CEO compensation. Return on Asset reflects how much return is generated on every rupiah invested in assets.…”

Executive Compensation in Emerging Markets: Theoretical Developments and Empirical Evidence

“…Lazarides et al (2008) conduct a study in Greece, a country without Anglo-Saxon characteristics, and confirm that the level of executive remuneration is positively associated with financial performance and negatively associated with corporate governance mechanisms. Parthasarathy et al (2006) use a more comprehensive dataset of Indian firms and find that CEOs who are promoters or owners receive compensation higher and with a greater incentive component.…”

An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of Firm Financial Performance

“…(Fels, 2010) claimed the GFC has again brought much attention and scrutiny to CEO remuneration packages and that CEO remuneration was one of the causes of the GFC. In the ongoing debate about executive remuneration, as argued by Lazarides et al (2008) citing (Ruiz-Verdú & Singh, 2014) that critics of current remuneration practices argued that remuneration packages are designed to facilitate rent extraction by managers rather than to provide those managers incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In this debate attention has been directed to the use of hidden or camouflaged forms of remuneration, which appear to be inconsistent with the maximization of shareholder value (Bebchuk & Jackson, 2005) and (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2007).…”