Executive incentives and payout policy: Empirical evidence from Europe

Cesari, Amedeo De; Ozkan, Neslihan

doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.12.011

Cited by 49 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 63 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…However, in civil law environments there are weak monitoring mechanisms in the management structure because of the dominance of executive directors, as they might have strong incentives to align with management with the purpose of maximizing their wealth to the detriment of shareholders (De Cesari and Ozkan, 2014; Prasanna, 2014). Executive directors on BD could decrease dividend payment because they do not have the need of using dividend payout as a monitoring mechanism(Maury and Pajuste, 2002;Francis et al, 2014;Van Pelt, 2013;De Cesari and Ozkan, 2014;Prasanna, 2014).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The board of directors and dividend policy: the effect of gender diversity

Pucheta‐Martínez¹,

Bel‐Oms²

2015

Ind Corp Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper we aim to study the impact on dividends policy of gender diversity on the board of directors (hereinafter BD). We hypothesise that the proportion of women directors, the proportion of independent, institutional and executive female directors, and the percentage of shares held by female directors on BD, have an impact on the dividends policy of Spanish companies. Our findings, analysing the whole sample, show that the proportion of female directors, and shares held by female directors, are positively associated with dividend payout, while the percentage of institutional female directors has a negative impact. The percentage of independent and executive female directors has no effect on dividend payout. When companies with losses are removed from the sample, the findings report that the percentage of female directors on BD and the percentage of independent female directors impact positively on dividend policy, while the percentage of institutional and executive female directors has a negative effect. The proportion of shares held by female directors on BD does not have an effect on dividend payout when only companies with profits are examined. Thus, the results confirm that gender diversity has an influence on dividend payout, so the existing legislation should encourage more participation by women in governing bodies. Our evidence supports the Act for Effective Equality between Women and Men, which establishes that listing companies have to achieve a quota of 40% of women in decision-making bodies by 2015.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The board of directors and dividend policy: the effect of gender diversity

Pucheta‐Martínez¹,

Bel‐Oms²

2015

Ind Corp Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Research on executive pay in Europe usually relies on databases such as BoardEx or Capital IQ when measuring individual CEO compensation (see for example Burns, McTier, and Minnick 2015, Croci, Gonenc, and Ozkan 2012, De Cesari and Ozkan 2015, Conyon et al 2013, Geiler and Renneboog 2016. Another method that is used are the data handpicked from companies' annual reports (for example Bouras and Gallali 2016, Hüttenbrink et al 2014, Muslu 2010, Oxelheim and Randøy 2005, Schmid and Wurster 2016, Gupta, Chu, and Ge 2016.…”

Section: Measurement Of Executive Compensation and Institutional Backmentioning

confidence: 99%

Executive Compensation in Europe: Realized Gains from Stock-Based Pay

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper adds to the empirical evidence on the extent to which stock-based pay incentivizes and rewards European corporate executives. It shows that the actual realized gains (that is, take-home compensation) from stock-based pay of CEOs in European publicly-listed firms may be underestimated by the use of "estimated fair value" measures. The paper also documents the heterogeneity among countries in terms of the levels and components of CEO take-home pay. We base our work on a sample of 301 large, publicly-traded companies listed in the S&P Europe 350 index from 11 EU countries: and United Kingdom for the fiscal year 2015. Through analyzing companies' annual reports, we have hand-collected data on various elements of compensation of the company's CEO in 2015, including the gains that executives realize from stock-based pay. We document that on average half of the total compensation of the European CEOs in our sample is stock-based, measured by actual realized gains, with large differences among countries. Although in some European countries the majority of total compensation is stock-based, the proportions are still well below those that prevail in the 1 United States. A comparison of the realized-gains measure of CEO compensation with the data based on fair value estimates shows that the latter underestimates the relevance of stockbased pay, in the case of some countries dramatically. Our research findings add to the existing research on CEO pay and the link between pay of EU-based corporate executives and the performance of the companies that they manage. Based on our work, we argue that realized gains measures of CEO pay should be the standard for assessing the incentives and rewards of senior corporate executives in Europe. Our research is the first step in building time series of European executive compensation that will be useful for policies concerning corporate governance and economic performance.

show abstract

“…Além de as entidades emitirem opções de ações para ajustarem os interesses dos gestores e dos acionistas, também são utilizadas como forma de remuneração aos empregados, atraindo-os e retendo-os, e, ainda, como instrumento de obtenção de rendimento de acionistas (Uchida, 2006;Cesari & Ozkan, 2015). A atração e retenção dos funcionários ocorre porque ao desligar-se da organização, antes da posse das opções de ações, o empregado perde o direito sobre elas.…”

Section: Planos De Opções De Açõesunclassified

“…A atração e retenção dos funcionários ocorre porque ao desligar-se da organização, antes da posse das opções de ações, o empregado perde o direito sobre elas. Além disso, quando aceitam, os empregados se tornam acionistas da própria empresa em que trabalham (Tzioumis, 2008;Cesari & Ozkan, 2015).…”

Section: Planos De Opções De Açõesunclassified

See 1 more Smart Citation

Fatores determinantes para adoção de planos de opções de ações em companhias abertas brasileiras

Moura

Padilha

Silva

2016

REPEC

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

O objetivo do estudo foi identificar os fatores determinantes para adoção de planos de opções de ações em companhias abertas brasileiras. Para tal, realizou-se pesquisa descritiva, conduzida por meio de análise documental e abordagem quantitativa, com emprego de regressão logística. A amostra foi composta por 158 companhias, com dados referentes ao período de 2009 a 2012. Os resultados evidenciaram um crescimento na quantidade de empresas que possuíam planos de opções de ações no período. Dentre os fatores tamanho da empresa, restrição de liquidez, concentração acionária, problema de horizonte, participação acionária do CEO, dualidade do cargo de CEO e presidente do conselho de administração, descritos na literatura como influenciadores para a utilização de planos de opções de ações, três se confirmaram na amostra analisada. Os fatores “liquidez corrente” no período de 2010 a 2012, “problema de horizonte” no período de 2009 a 2012 e “participação acionária” no ano de 2012. Estes achados fornecem mais evidências de relações positivas no cenário brasileiro.

show abstract

Executive incentives and payout policy: Empirical evidence from Europe

Cited by 49 publications

References 63 publications

The board of directors and dividend policy: the effect of gender diversity

The board of directors and dividend policy: the effect of gender diversity

Executive Compensation in Europe: Realized Gains from Stock-Based Pay

Fatores determinantes para adoção de planos de opções de ações em companhias abertas brasileiras

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About