Executive‐Judicial Interaction as a Factor in Explaining Presidential Policy Making

Abstract

This study analyzes the nexus between the executive and judicial branches in understanding presidential success in domestic policy making from a system of separated powers perspective. The author investigates the nature of the interaction between the solicitor general and the Supreme Court's rulings in cases in which the federal government participated in the subissue area of civil rights during the Kennedy administration. The author found that the administration's civil rights litigation stralegy was highly succesful before the Warren Court. However, a content analysis of the solicitor general‘s briefs revealed a more complex and cautious approach to the civil rights cases. I conclude by suggesting that an insightful line of inquiry into understanding presidential influence in domestic policy making should include, not exclude, the Supreme Court.

Presidential Rhetoric and U.S. Supreme Court Rulings: The Effect of Going Public on Citizen Evaluations of Institutions and Policy

“…The Court benefits from the relative insulation of the judiciary, allowing the justices a degree of autonomy in ruling and supporting the capability of placing constraints on the executive (Segal and Spaeth ). However, presidents can serve to constrain the Supreme Court through threats of nonimplementation, building support for court curbing efforts, using the solicitor general as a signal, strategically using litigation to shape policy, and changing the composition of the bench with appointments (Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman ; Clark ; Graham ; Johnson ; Segal, Timpone, and Howard ). Where a considerable body of literature has detailed the president's ability to sanction the Court through formal mechanisms of power, there is a dearth of research detailing the influence of presidents' appeals to the public with regard to the high court.…”