Executive Remuneration and Corporate Performance

Krauter, Elizabeth; Sousa, Almir Ferreira de

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1278745

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 8 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The results received are divided in the form of direct and indirect remuneration. Direct remuneration is the amount of money received by an employee for a job well done which consists of fixed and variable remuneration [10]; [14] in [30]. Indirect remuneration, on the other hand, provided by the organization for employees on the performance achieved with the aim to provide comfort and security to them, such as life insurance, health insurance, car, vacation, and other social insurance.…”

Section: Theoretical Framework and Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Remuneration, Job Satisfaction and OCB on the Employee Performance

Agustiningsih¹

2016

SJBM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study aims to: (1) analyze the effect of remuneration, job satisfaction and Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) on employee performance; (2) analyze the job satisfaction as a mediating variable of the effect remuneration on employee performance; and (3) analyze OCB role in mediating the effect of remuneration and job satisfaction on employee performance. Data was collected using saturated sampling method. The population consisted of 138 Account Representative (AR) Supervision of the work in the Tax Office in Malang area, the Regional Office of Directorate General of Taxes East Java III. Data analysis using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) or usually called Partial Least Squares Path Modelling (PLS-PM). The results showed that the remuneration is significantly and negatively effect the performance of AR Supervision, but the satisfaction and OCB do not significantly effect the performance of AR Supervision. Furthermore, remuneration and satisfaction positively and significantly effect AR satisfaction and OCB respectively, but remuneration does not significantly effect OCB. In relation to the indirect effects, job satisfaction and OCB do not mediate the effect of remuneration on the AR Supervision performance, neither OCB mediate the effect of job satisfaction on the AR Supervision performance. The results of this study indicate that the concept of the higher the remuneration received by employees, the higher their performance will be, only occurs in normal conditions. If there are obstacles in the work implementation process, then this concept does not apply. Therefore, the Directorate General of Taxation institution must provide the solution and attention to the barriers experienced by AR Supervision in order to maximize their performance.

show abstract

Section: Theoretical Framework and Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Remuneration, Job Satisfaction and OCB on the Employee Performance

Agustiningsih¹

2016

SJBM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Recent literature suggests strong links between the GFC and earnings management (Krauter and Sousa, 2009;Habib et al, 2013). Prior studies link economic conditions with how earnings are managed and that firms may be encouraged to engage in earnings management when a financial crisis erupts (Dichev and Skinner, 2002;Charitou et al, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of global financial crisis on the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management

Assenso-Okofo

Ali

Ahmed

2020

IJAIM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effects of global financial crisis (GFC) on chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation and earnings management relationship. Specifically, the authors examine whether the recent financial crisis had moderated the relationship between CEO bonus and discretionary accruals. Design/methodology/approach The authors use panel data for 1,800 firm-year observations (over a period of six years from 2005 to 2010) and use univariate and multivariate tests to test their hypothesis. The authors divide the period into pre-crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis periods to examine how the different financial crisis periods affect the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management. Various alternative tests including endogeneity test suggest that the results are robust. Findings The authors’ multivariate results indicate that the relationship between CEO’ compensation and earnings management changes because of the GFC. Practical implications The findings, therefore, justify more monitoring and scrutiny to limit the existence of opportunistic managerial behaviour and for the appropriate designing of CEO compensation packages during abnormal economic circumstances. Originality/value So far as the authors’ knowledge goes, this is the first study which examines the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management during GFC.

show abstract

“…Using an example from Australia, Higbee (2008) pointed out that the CEO of Challenger Financial Services Group received a 66 per cent increase in remuneration while the company experienced losses. These examples demonstrate that executive remuneration and company performance are not commensurate (Krauter, & Sousa, 2009;Lee 2009). Thus, if a company is not performing well, its executives may still receive a large "reward" (Woldring 1995).…”

Section: Former Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Older studies (for example , Mehran 1995;Carpenter & Sanders 2002) pointed out that fixed remuneration, cash bonuses and stock options are related to company performance. Furthermore, Krauter and Sousa (2009) explored the relationship between executives' remuneration and performance of manufacturing companies in Brazil and also found that salary is related to company performance.…”

Section: 1executives' Remuneration and Company's Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Executive Remuneration, Financial Crisis and ‘Say on Pay’ Rule

Azim

Ahmmod

2014

JIBE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Among the alternatives to reduce agency conflict, executive remuneration has commonly been perceived as the best possible solution. Financial meltdown is commonly attributed to the large portion of remuneration rewarded to the executives. As a response, 'say on pay' rule, introduced in 2011which provides shareholders right to vote for or against executives remuneration package. Proponents of this new rule argue that reforms will fortify the association between the shareholders and the executives of the board, will ensure that board members execute fiduciary duty placed upon them. However, the critics think this new rule will be unsuccessful in monitor directors' remuneration, and contemplate it to be backward-looking rather than forward-looking. Despite the importance of these issues, contextual analyses of executives' remuneration and company performance in the Australian context are still limited. This paper, using sample from top 200 Australian listed companies, aims to study the relationship between executive remuneration and companies' performance during the financial crisis in 2006-2009. Methodology of this research is based on two approaches: firstly, we investigate the pay-for-performance relationship during the global financial crisis; secondly, identify cause and effects relationships through lead and lag analysis. Overall, this research concludes that Australia's reward system is quite effective and reflects market based performance, specially in respect to Earnings per Share and Dividend Yield. Therefore, the introduction of 'say on pay' rule is appropriate in Australian context.

show abstract

Executive Remuneration and Corporate Performance

Cited by 9 publications

References 8 publications

The Effect of Remuneration, Job Satisfaction and OCB on the Employee Performance

The Effect of Remuneration, Job Satisfaction and OCB on the Employee Performance

The effects of global financial crisis on the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management

Executive Remuneration, Financial Crisis and ‘Say on Pay’ Rule

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About