Executive veto power and credit claiming

Indriðason, Indriði H.

doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9595-8

Cited by 13 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Though widely used in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the pocket veto was last used by President Bill Clinton (1993-2001. The line-item veto-present in several states of the union, often restricted to budget bills (Alemán and Tsebelis 2005), and ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court for the federal government (Indridason 2011;Spitzer 1997)-is common in several Latin American countries, where it is known as a partial or suppressive veto.…”

Section: Types Of Presidential Vetoesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018

Belmar Soto,

Navia,

Osorio

2023

Lat Am Polit Soc

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Defined as a credible threat that strengthens the bargaining position of the executive, presidential vetoes, widely understudied, carry a stigma of confrontation between state powers. But under some institutional setups, partial vetoes can be an additional step in the executive–legislative bargaining process. After a discussion of whether partial vetoes are a proactive legislative tool or a bargaining tool to induce executive–legislative cooperation, we test four hypotheses using the 2,346 bills introduced in Chile between 1990 and 2018 that reached a vetoable stage. We identified 97 partial vetoes (4.2 percent) and one total veto. Presidents are more likely to veto bills with more complex legislative processes and when they have stronger support in at least one chamber, but more popular presidents do not veto more bills. As most presidential vetoes in Chile are partial, they are an additional executive–legislative bargaining step in the lawmaking process rather than evidence of hyperpresidentialism.

show abstract

Section: Types Of Presidential Vetoesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018

Belmar Soto,

Navia,

Osorio

2023

Lat Am Polit Soc

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…En referencia a sus efectos lo ha denominado como "veto modificatorio" (Tsebelis y Rizova 2005;Alemán y Schwartz 2006;Alemán 2003;Aninat y Londregan 2005). Según la relación entre Ejecutivo y Legislativo como "veto de bolsillo" o "veto transado" (Spitzer 2001;Palanza y Sin 2013;Cameron 2012;Indridason 2011;Molinelli 1996). Según el procedimiento parlamentario como "veto por artículos" (Palanza y Sin 2013).…”

Section: Desbloqueo Y Capacidades Transaccionales Del Vetounclassified

El “efecto luna de miel” en contextos de multipartidismo fragmentado

Hidalgo Andrade

2023

Cálamo

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Este trabajo estudia las razones del veto total en un contexto de tensión en las relaciones entre el Ejecutivo y el Legislativo. El estudio arranca de la teoría del veto como poder presidencial de bloqueo y tiende un puente en el debate sobre la pugna de poderes explicada desde los hallazgos más recientes sobre vetos y producción legislativa en Ecuador desde 1984 a 2013. Este trabajo se divide en cinco partes. La primera propone un breve debate teórico sobre el poder de bloqueo del veto. La segunda parte se ocupa de estudiar el diseño institucional de la producción legislativa desde el debate de la pugna de poderes. La tercera se introduce en la literatura sobre las figuras del Gobierno de minoría y el multipartidismo fragmentado. La cuarta parte evalúa los datos presentados en este trabajo. La quinta parte presenta algunas conclusiones.

show abstract

“…Recent work by Indridason (2011), who also places emphasis on the line-item veto, does a fine job of bringing together important issues in legislative politics to assess commonly held expectations regarding vetoes. He advances a model of veto bargaining over public goods and pork barrel spending in the presence of credit-claiming incentives.…”

Section: Vetoes and Interbranch Bargainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multiparty Presidential Systems

Palanza

Sin

2013

Comparative Political Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article analyzes the use of vetoes in multiparty presidential systems. It suggests that the nature of executive-legislative bargaining is fundamentally altered when multiple parties compose the legislature and when presidential veto prerogatives are extended to incorporate partial (line-item) vetoes. Using a data set that includes all bills passed by the Argentine Congress in the past 25 years, we estimate veto occurrence under different scenarios. Our findings are at odds with received expectations: whether the President holds a majority in Congress or not fails to explain variations in the likelihood of vetoes. Instead, the level of significance of legislation is relevant for predicting vetoes, with landmark legislation being more likely to be vetoed regardless of levels of support for the president in Congress. In addition, partial vetoes become the preferred alternative when confronting legislation initiated by the president herself.

show abstract

Executive veto power and credit claiming

Cited by 13 publications

References 24 publications

Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018

Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018

El “efecto luna de miel” en contextos de multipartidismo fragmentado

Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multiparty Presidential Systems

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About