Executives’ Behaviour and Innovation in Corporate Governance: The Case of Internet Voting at Shareholders’ General Meetings in French Listed Companies

Cheffi, Walid; Abdennadher, Sonia

doi:10.1007/s10551-017-3586-3

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…This development could contribute to the alignment of companies' interests with those of shareholders. Inter voting may result in loss of control [37]. However, Overall, the case is that the introduction of Internet voting somewhat reverses the relationship between shareholders and executives about corporate governance.…”

Section: Annual Generating Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enhancement of state-owned enterprises’ financial reporting through e-governance

Chiuriri,

Arshad

2023

E3S Web Conf.

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State-owned enterprises in Zimbabwe often take long to report their financial statements due to unfunded policy mandates, weak governance, and a lack of capacity of governments to oversee the enterprises/parastatals. Information systems can help improve the operation of state enterprises and expedite financial reporting by interfacing e-governance and corporate governance. This paper aims to present a systematic empirical literature review to examine the role of corporate governance in the timeliness of financial reporting and opportunities of e-Corporate Governance in State-owned enterprises. Specifically, the proposed study’s motivation aroused from vast literature focusing on the role of corporate governance in the timeliness of financial reporting and opportunities of e-Corporate Governance in State-owned enterprises. The study reviewed some of the articles for literature that deliver robust suggestions on the timeliness of financial reporting and opportunities of e-Corporate Governance in State-owned enterprises. Findings suggest that effective corporate governance can improve the performance and accountability of state enterprises. E-corporate governance can help state enterprises report their financial statements promptly. Adoption of e-governance can improve corporate governance in state enterprises by providing best practices and independent oversight mechanisms.

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Section: Annual Generating Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enhancement of state-owned enterprises’ financial reporting through e-governance

Chiuriri,

Arshad

2023

E3S Web Conf.

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“…Different from the existing studies that mostly focus on the shareholder governance effect of the large shareholders or the actual controllers (Xiao et al , 2020; Gao et al , 2020), this paper mainly studies the governance effect of noncontrolling shareholders in the collusive behavior of large shareholders and the management of the target company. Some scholars find that in addition to the supervision mechanism, noncontrolling shareholders may play a role in corporate governance by appointing directors in the board of directors to raise objections, so as to inhibit the self-interest behavior of controlling shareholders and the opportunistic behavior of the management (Jiang, 2015a; Cheffi and Abdennadher, 2019). Zeng et al (2018) reveal that the shareholding of institutional investors may restrain the encroachment intention of the controlling shareholder, which is beneficial for corporate governance.…”

Section: Additional Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Control transfer and old shareholder governance of the “seller”: who hinders the management retention?

Wang

Dai

et al. 2022

NBRI

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Purpose Under the background of China’s initial public offering approval system, the buyer may acquire the listed company more for the purpose of obtaining listing qualification, and the operation performance of target company may not be the main motivation for evaluating and replacing the management, which may breed the self-interest motivation of the management to collude with the buyer to lower the price to continue to stay in office. Further, if the management and the buyer collude successfully and achieve retention by reducing the transfer price of control and sacrificing the interests of the “seller,” it is worth discussing whether the old shareholders of the “seller” existing in the firm can prevent the self-interest management from continuing to remain in office through effective corporate governance mechanism. Design/methodology/approach Taking A-share listed companies with control transfer from 2000 to 2017 as sample, this paper investigates the strategy, path and retention consequence of the target company’s market selected top management who collude with the new controlling shareholder to avoid the risk of being taken over by control transfer. Findings This research explores that negative earnings management behavior may reduce the real premium of control transfer after deducting the “shell value.” The lower the real premium of control transfer after deducting the “shell value,” the higher the probability of management retention after control transfer. This paper also reveals that the real premium of control transfer after deducting the “shell value” plays complete mediation role between the negative earnings management behavior of the management and their own retention. The mediation effect of “collusion and price reduction” in the control transfer will be inversely moderated by the governance mechanism of noncontrolling shareholders including the old shareholders of the seller. Originality/value This paper not only constitutes a supplement to the existing literature but also provides empirical evidence for standardizing the control transfer behavior of listed companies, and making good use of the old shareholders of the seller to improve corporate governance and alleviate agency conflict after control transfer.

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“…Therefore, this study adopts a distinctive approach to analyse the determinants of employees innovative behaviour in the hotels industry, by proposing and empirically testing an integrated model, with contributions from well-grounded theories, namely the institutional theory and the fit theory. These theories have received substantial empirical support in explaining innovative behaviour (e.g., Cheffi and Abdennadher, 2019;Engelen et al, 2018;Fuentelsaz et al, 2018;Geels, 2004;Laukkanen and Patala, 2014). The proposed model seeks to take advantage of the validity, parsimony and reliability that these theories provide as determinants of innovative behaviour in order to improve explanatory and predictive power.…”

Section: Institutional Theory and Innovative Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Innovative Behaviour in the Hotel Industry: A cross-Cultural Study

Eid

Agag

2020

International Journal of Hospitality Management

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Executives’ Behaviour and Innovation in Corporate Governance: The Case of Internet Voting at Shareholders’ General Meetings in French Listed Companies

Cited by 10 publications

References 60 publications

Enhancement of state-owned enterprises’ financial reporting through e-governance

Enhancement of state-owned enterprises’ financial reporting through e-governance

Control transfer and old shareholder governance of the “seller”: who hinders the management retention?

Determinants of Innovative Behaviour in the Hotel Industry: A cross-Cultural Study

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