Executives' horizon, internal governance and stock market liquidity

Jain, Pawan; Jiang, Christine X.; Mekhaimer, Mohamed A.

doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.06.005

Cited by 33 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 69 publications

(113 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Acharya et al (2011) proposed the concept of internal governance of the TMT, and regarded the TMT as an aggregate of different career visions and interest appeals. Jain et al (2016) made it clear that this form of key subordinate executive governance is a bottom-up corporate governance mechanism. Cheng et al (2016) further pointed out that subordinate executives would exert an influence on the CEO and urge them to restrain the tendency of short-sightedness and make decisions in line with long-term values, which construct the governance role for the CEO through supervision motivation and supervision ability.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Key Subordinate Executive G...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Acharya et al (2011) pointed out that subordinate executives can make the CEO pay attention to far-sighted interests because they have a longer career horizon. Jain et al (2016) emphasized the important influence of age on individual behavior and future aspirations, and researchers believed that the age difference between CEO and subordinates is key to the internal governance of TMT. Cheng et al (2016) believed that the relative horizon adopted by Jain et al (2016) is not accurate enough, and subordinates' own horizon is more important.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Key Subordinate Executive G...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Jain et al (2016) emphasized the important influence of age on individual behavior and future aspirations, and researchers believed that the age difference between CEO and subordinates is key to the internal governance of TMT. Cheng et al (2016) believed that the relative horizon adopted by Jain et al (2016) is not accurate enough, and subordinates' own horizon is more important. Then, the supervisory motivation of key subordinate executives is captured by using their remaining career horizons.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Key Subordinate Executive G...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, this article refines the subject of key subordinate executives. The subordinate executives involved in the previous literature are generally defined as the top four non-CEO executives (Jain et al, 2016). However, these studies overlook the special status of vice president (VP) after CEO.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Third, this article expands the governance role of key subordinate executives. Previous literature studies show that subordinate executives have governance effects on stock liquidity, earning management, and corporate social responsibility (Chen and Zhou, 2016;Cheng et al, 2016;Jain et al, 2016). However, it has not been examined how the subordinate executive governance affects accounting conservatism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Key Subordinate Executive Governance, CEO Overconfidence, and Accounting Conservatism: From the Perspective of Sustainable Development

Kuang

2022

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Key subordinate executives play the role of connecting superiors and subordinates within the top management team (TMT). Based on the heterogeneity of TMT preference, this article takes the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 as a sample to examine whether key subordinate executive governance can affect the short-sighted behavior of CEOs. The empirical result shows that there is a positive relationship between key subordinate executive governance and accounting conservatism, and CEO overconfidence can positively moderate the relationship. The study also shows that there is a significant positive relationship between key subordinate executive governance and accounting conservatism in private enterprises and enterprises with high market competition, that is, the key subordinate executives of these two types of enterprises can better enhance the conservatism under the stimulation of CEO overconfidence. This study contributes to the literature by examining how key subordinate executives affect accounting conservatism and link the prudential attitude of key subordinate executives with the behavioral tendency of CEO overconfidence, which has managerial implications for improving the power balance mechanism of TMT and strengthening the human resource incentive of key subordinate executives.

show abstract

Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Key Subordinate Executive G...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Key Subordinate Executive G...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Key Subordinate Executive G...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Key Subordinate Executive Governance, CEO Overconfidence, and Accounting Conservatism: From the Perspective of Sustainable Development

Kuang

2022

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

How does multi‐agent govern corporate greenwashing? A stakeholder engagement perspective from “common” to “collaborative” governance

Wang

Sun

Zhu

et al. 2022

Corp Soc Responsibility Env

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Greenwashing is an obstacle to the sustainable development of society, but the current governance of greenwashing is still a “common” governance, not a “collaborative” governance. Accordingly, this study focuses on the three stakeholders of greenwashing governance: company, media and government. Using a sample of listed companies that have published social responsibility reports from 2014 to 2018, this study analyzes the influence mechanism of media reports on greenwashing and discusses the moderating role of government regulation and mediating role of internal supervision. This study finds that internal supervision plays a hiding role in the process of media reports reducing greenwashing, but government regulation has a weakening effect on this hiding effect, showing a “common” governance. Simultaneously, this “common” governance is heterogeneous across time (i.e., corporate life cycle), space (i.e., spatial spillovers) and environment (i.e., the uncertainty of corporate external policies). However, when the cooperation between the government and the media is strengthened, the hiding behavior of the companies is suppressed and the performance of greenwashing governance is improved, so that “collaborative” governance is achieved. Against this backdrop, this study provides a macro‐to‐micro governance policy framework for corporate greenwashing from the four dimensions of strategy, systems, tools, and information to achieve “collaborative” governance. This study enriches the research on the corporate greenwashing governance and has practical implications for the government, media and other stakeholders.

show abstract