Existence and Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games

We present a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing equilibria in congestion games, under smoothed running-time analysis. More precisely, we prove that if the resource costs of a congestion game are randomly perturbed by independent noises, whose density is at most ϕ, then any sequence of (1 + ε)-improving dynamics will reach an (1 + ε)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) after an expected number of steps which is strongly polynomial in 1 ε , ϕ, and the size of the game's description. Our results establish a sharp contrast to the traditional worst-case analysis setting, where it is known that better-response dynamics take exponentially long to converge to α-approximate PNE, for any constant factor α ≥ 1. As a matter of fact, computing α-approximate PNE in congestion games is PLS-hard.We demonstrate how our analysis can be applied to various different models of congestion games including general, step-function, and polynomial cost, as well as fair cost-sharing games (where the resource costs are decreasing). It is important to note that our bounds do not depend explicitly on the cardinality of the players' strategy sets, and thus the smoothed FPTAS is readily applicable to network congestion games as well.

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Existence and Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games

Cited by 2 publications

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A Unifying Approximate Potential for Weighted Congestion Games

A Unifying Approximate Potential for Weighted Congestion Games

A Unifying Approximate Potential for Weighted Congestion Games

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