2016
DOI: 10.1080/02331934.2016.1218875
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Existence of equilibrium for generalized games in choice form and applications

Abstract: Abstract. This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems of vector quasi-equilibrium problems as an application. Our work outlines that there still is much to be gained from using the results concerning the existence of equilibrium of games as tools of research for other optimization problems.Keywords: equilibrium in ch… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2017
2017
2017
2017

Publication Types

Select...
3

Relationship

3
0

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 30 publications
(38 reference statements)
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…We also consider a second constraint correspondence in the generalized game in choice form, and we present the following concepts, firstly defined in Patriche, which generalize the model and the solution concept due to Ferrara and Stefanescu …”
Section: Games and Equilibrium Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…We also consider a second constraint correspondence in the generalized game in choice form, and we present the following concepts, firstly defined in Patriche, which generalize the model and the solution concept due to Ferrara and Stefanescu …”
Section: Games and Equilibrium Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We recall that the notion of equilibrium in choice does not require the players' preferences to be explicitly represented or the choice of a player to be the best reply to the strategy combination of the others. The results of this section differ from the ones obtained by the author in Patriche, by the new hypotheses.…”
Section: Games and Equilibrium Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation