2020
DOI: 10.1080/02331934.2020.1778690
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Existence of quasi-equilibria on unbounded constraint sets

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Cited by 11 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Most of the results concerning (QEP) are stated in a finite-dimensional framework, on a compact set C, and they involve generalized monotonicity assumptions on f together with upper semicontinuity of the set-valued map which describes the constraint, as well as lower semicontinuity of this map with the additional assumption of the closedness of the set of fixed points (see, for instance, [9]). In case of an unbounded set C, an additional coercivity condition is required (for a recent result, see [12]).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Most of the results concerning (QEP) are stated in a finite-dimensional framework, on a compact set C, and they involve generalized monotonicity assumptions on f together with upper semicontinuity of the set-valued map which describes the constraint, as well as lower semicontinuity of this map with the additional assumption of the closedness of the set of fixed points (see, for instance, [9]). In case of an unbounded set C, an additional coercivity condition is required (for a recent result, see [12]).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A special case of this concept is used in [26] under the name "Pareto equilibrium" for a bicriteria game with C i = −R 2 + . A generalized Nash equilibrium studied in [9] (resp. [10]) corresponds to our concept where Y i = R, C i = R + (resp.…”
Section: Furthermore For Allmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Existence of equilibria for Nash games has been well-studied and the appropriate framework seems to be the case of (generalized) convexity conditions (see e.g. [7,6]). However, for our purpose of considering the Nash game between the leaders of a bilevel game, generalized convexity conditions are generally not satisfied, and moreover, equilibria may fail to exist (See [30,Example 4]).…”
Section: Preliminaries and Notationmentioning
confidence: 99%