Exit, voice, and loyalty: Parent–child relations in the proto-industrial household economy (Zürich, 17th–18th centuries)

Abstract

This article formulates a simple model of parent-child interest conflicts. Based on a simple model of a household economy with a production or wage income function, a labor maintenance cost function, and an externally given wage rate, it discusses potential conflicts over the appropriation of the product of family members' labor in terms of the trilogy of exit, voice, and loyalty. The model is then explored by using household lists that provide detailed information on the economic activity of individuals. Many young proto-industrial workers used the threat of exiting their parents' household to keep much of their earnings through the Rast custom (boarding allowance). The threat of leaving operated well among the middle and lower classes of proto-industrial society, but it is unclear whether it also worked for the daughters of farmers who apparently left home much earlier than their brothers. The discourse of contemporaries about the Rast custom are considered and interpreted as a counterstrategy against the exit threat in which the elders fostered a sense of loyalty among the young. D 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.