Exit, voice, loyalty, and … disobedience: When a CEO opposes his principal

Abstract

Research Question/Issue On the basis of a dynamic interrelation between the assumptions of agency theory and stewardship theory, this study seeks to make sense of disobedience at the highest corporate level. Departing from a processual view in order to better understand how loyalty plays a critical role in the relationships between a CEO and his/her principal, we propose a conceptualization of the options open to a top executive in disagreement with the principal. We view the relationship from “below” by primarily taking the CEO's perspective, resulting in a more complex view on how “duty” is perceived and acted upon by the CEO. Research Findings/Insights We use the rich and abundant archives left behind by the CEO of a large French firm. We had access to over 50,000 pages of documents that allowed us to follow the CEO and his relationships with his principals, at times from day to day. We found two competing loyalties (loyalty to the principal—agency theory—and loyalty to the organization—stewardship theory) that gradually become independent of each other, triggering different responses in terms of “exits” from the relationship with the principal. This particular dynamic in which the CEO acted as a guardian of the overall purpose of the organization enabled the emergence, development, and consolidation of a disobedience process that over the years contributed to the well‐being of his firm as well as to the social changes occurring in France at that time. Theoretical/Academic Implications This longitudinal study extends the corporate governance literature by offering a process‐oriented approach, quite rare in this stream of research, and a more dynamic view of how agency theory and stewardship theory interact. Then, by providing empirical support for the idea that the disobedience process can protect and allow an organization to first evolve positively over time and eventually contribute to social improvements, our study proposes a form of responsible stewardship. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study offers important insights for executives, directors, and shareholders on how to make sense of, and in the long run potentially benefit from, disobedience at the highest corporate levels.

Diversity and disobedience at the top, pay incentives, social norms, and board reforms: A kaleidoscope of corporate governance research

“…Sardais et al (2021) provide an extension of Hirschman's (1970) seminal theory of exit, voice, and loyalty by applying this model directly to the field of CEO behavior in relationship to his/her principals, adding the fourth response of disobedience that may be available to powerful top executives with sufficient discretion, and viewing loyalty as an attitude, rather than behavior, that may vary between weak and strong and change over time. Such an extended model is utilized to study disobedience at the top of the organization and to better understand the role of loyalty in the relationships between a CEO and his/her principal.…”

Introduction to the Point‐Counterpoint: The Corporate Objective as a Contingency

“…Using the simple Hall and Soskice (2001) framework, in LMEs we might expect firms to adopt more of a SVM or, in some instances, SGM, while in CMEs, we would expect more of a SM model. In the French context, Sardais et al (2021, CGIR) document Renault’s CEO as acting for the good of the organization, as a guardian of the organization’s mission, even when such actions eventually involved disobedience to his principal (the state). Iwai (1999) documents similar practices among Japanese CEOs.…”