2014
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2492204
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Exodus from Sovereign Risk: Global Asset and Information Networks in the Pricing of Corporate Credit Risk

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
18
0

Year Published

2016
2016
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
6
1
1

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 17 publications
(20 citation statements)
references
References 84 publications
2
18
0
Order By: Relevance
“…While the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) defines the recessionary period as being from December 2007 to June 2009, the U.S. and global economies suffered from high unemployment rates, low consumer confidence, a weak housing market, low levels of bank lending, and escalating federal debts well into fiscal year 2010 (Geiger, Raghunandan, & Riccardi, ; Lee, Naranjo, & Sirmans, ; Wingfield, ). Thus, we define calendar years 2007–2010 as the “crisis” period and five years preceding the crisis period as pre‐crisis period (2002–2006).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) defines the recessionary period as being from December 2007 to June 2009, the U.S. and global economies suffered from high unemployment rates, low consumer confidence, a weak housing market, low levels of bank lending, and escalating federal debts well into fiscal year 2010 (Geiger, Raghunandan, & Riccardi, ; Lee, Naranjo, & Sirmans, ; Wingfield, ). Thus, we define calendar years 2007–2010 as the “crisis” period and five years preceding the crisis period as pre‐crisis period (2002–2006).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Regarding the debate on optimal bundle of governance mechanisms in mitigating agency costs (Aslan & Kumar, 2014), our research suggests that a firm which chooses to respond to market-level openness by actively engaging with their own firm-level financial integration can signal their corporate governance quality to investors, enhancing the benefits associated with firm-level financial integration and reducing the agency costs associated with market-level financial openness. During the financial crisis period, such active engagement in firm-level financial integration is particularly important for investors to delink their firms' information environment from others', in line with Lee et al, (2016).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When market-level investment barriers are eliminated by policy makers, firm-level investment barriers can be maintained by controlling shareholders to protect their own private benefits, which further stimulates foreign investor's home bias problems 3 . In contrast, when market-level investment barriers are maintained by policy makers and regulators, firm-level investment barriers can be eliminated by controlling shareholders if they actively engage in global asset and information connections to delink their firms from their sovereign and country risks (Lee et al, 2016). Given these decisions are independent, a firm from an emerging market can therefore choose not to engage, to engage with either market-level or firm-level financial integration, or to engage with both.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…() argue that estimates of the global diversification discount are biased if the value of a US multinational firm is compared to a benchmark portfolio of US same industry standalone firms. However, as originally noted by Denis, Denis, and Yost () and more recently quantified by Lee, Naranjo, and Sirmans (), the problem with comparing a US multinational to foreign country counterparts is that differences in legal, regulatory, tax and political institutions influence the comparison and thereby bias the estimate of the value of global diversification.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%