ExorcisingGrice's ghost: an empirical approach to studying intentional communication in animals

Abstract

International audienceLanguage's intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) production of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans

Great ape gestures: intentional communication with a rich set of innate signals

“…We should stress that none of the evidence for intentional gesture (or vocal) usage by apes goes beyond first-order intentionality (Townsend et al 2016); that is, it is evidence that a signaller has a specific result in mind, in terms of another individual’s behaviour, and will work flexibly to achieve that result. There is no evidence to date that ape signallers intend to change the knowledge or beliefs of their audiences.…”

A comparative neurological approach to emotional expressions in primate vocalizations

“…Intentional production of calls suggests that animals have control over their vocal tract to produce specific intentional vocalizations; animals thus communicate intentionally a particular content by producing voluntary and recipient-direct signals as a means to reach that goal, modifying the recipient's behavior in the process (Townsend et al, 2016). While still debated, there is now much evidence of such control in primates, particularly chimpanzees (Crockford et al, 2012;Gruber and Zuberbühler, 2013;Schel et al, 2013;Townsend et al, 2016), although this could also constitute cases of contextual learning (Janik and Slater, 2000). An important aspect of the intentional characteristic of a call is that it may not prevent it from bearing emotional content, as is the case in humans.…”

“…The possibility that primate vocalizations bear a strong emotional content has nevertheless mostly been considered in discussions related to the evolution of human language, usually as opposed to the presumed unique characteristics of human language. More precisely, nonhuman primate vocal communication systems have been considered similar to human emotional vocal production but different and potentially evolutionary unrelated to human speech, as opposed to their more controlled gestures (Tomasello, 2008). For instance, Tomasello (2008) states that primate vocalizations are ".…”

“…More precisely, nonhuman primate vocal communication systems have been considered similar to human emotional vocal production but different and potentially evolutionary unrelated to human speech, as opposed to their more controlled gestures (Tomasello, 2008). For instance, Tomasello (2008) states that primate vocalizations are ". .…”

“…Some of them undoubtedly are (Tomasello, 2008), but so are some equally uncontrollable human vocalizations such as screaming, groaning, crying, or laughing (Groswasser et al, 1988;Mariani et al, 1980). However, primates may also have more control over intentional calls (calls that are produced with the aim of fulfilling a goal) or referential calls (calls that indicate something to someone), which both fulfill a complementary communicative role to the conveying of emotions (Crockford et al, 2012;Liebal et al, 2014;Sievers and Gruber, 2016); finally some calls may have a learnt component (e.g.…”