biologized philosophical view (that of e.g. Cavendish or Conway who are, broadly speaking naturalists). Rather than appealing to a metaphysics of vital force, or of self-organizing matter, this version of vitalism, which I shall refer to as 'medical vitalism', seems to be more of a 'systemic' theory: an attempt to grasp and describe top-level ('organizational', 'organismic', 'holistic') features of living systems (Wolfe 2017(Wolfe , 2019.In this entry I seek to introduce some periodization in our thinking about early modern (and Enlightenment) vitalism, emphasizing the difference between the seventeenth-century context and that of the following generations -culminating in the ideas of the Montpellier School. This periodization should also function as a kind of taxonomy or at least distinction between some basic types of vitalism. As I discuss in closing, these distinctions can cut across the texts and figures we are dealing with, differently: metaphysical vs. non-metaphysical vitalism, philosophical vs. medical vitalism, medical vs. 'embryological' vitalism, and so on. I examine successively vitalism's Renaissance prehistory, its proliferation as 'vital matter theory' in seventeenth-century England (in authors such as Cavendish, Conway and Glisson, with brief considerations on Harvey and van Helmont), and its mature expression in eighteenth-century Montpellier (notably with Bordeu and Ménuret de Chambaud).
Vitalism: a problem of definitionWith a term like 'vitalism', one could proceed by giving a definition -I would rather suggest a distinction between different forms of vitalism, as I'll discuss below -or one could ask, who is a vitalist?If we applied the latter method strictly and looked up its usage and who the term is applied to, we would find Aristotle called a vitalist by many authorities (including Pagel and Grmek), for his notion of ensouled matter, and/or his theory of generation. Oddly, Hans Driesch went as far as to call Aristotle "the first exponent of a scientific 'vitalism'" (Driesch 1914, 11, 19). To call Aristotle a vitalist because he holds that the soul is life (or, when dealing with the early modern period, to call William Harvey a vitalist because of the idea that 'the blood is life', as I discuss below) seems a very thin, casual use of the term. I would suggest that if one is to apply this term in earnest, one has to provide a careful definition, however stipulative. This is absent when scholars happily call Harvey, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, and Adam Smith vitalists, at which point it becomes impossible to give a clear or strict meaning to the term, other than a vague appeal to some inherent dynamism or vitality (in the mind, in society, in the economy…).Faced with this kind of vagueness, I suggest that the term 'vitalism' be restricted to theories in which the difference between 'life' and 'non-life' (living matter and non-living matter, living bodies and dead bodies, bodies and machines, biology and physics, etc.) is crucial, however this difference is detailed and laid out. A careful...