In learning about the world, we must not only make inferences based on minimal evidence, but must deal with conflicting evidence and question those initial inferences when they appear to be wrong. In three experiments (N=96), we found that in some cases young children only revise their causal beliefs when conflicting evidence is explicitly demonstrated for them.Four-and 5-year-old children inferred a rule about what objects had causal powers, and then saw evidence conflicting with that initial inference. Critically, the conflicting evidence was produced either instrumentally and intentionally, or demonstrated communicatively and pedagogically.Only when evidence was explicitly demonstrated for them did children revise their initial hypothesis and use a subtle clue to infer the correct rule.Keywords: belief revision; categorization; pedagogy; social cognition; conceptual development Pedagogy and counterevidence 3
Look again: Pedagogical demonstration facilitates children's use of counterevidenceAs humans, we live in a world of unfathomable uncertainty, yet assume that within that noise there are signals that will help us derive meaning and order. We search for meaningful patterns that help explain the structure of the world (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014), and we both strive to and succeed in identifying those patterns and using them to organize our knowledge, actions, judgments, and decisions across a wide variety of contexts (Gelman, 2003;Gelman & Wellman, 1991;Keil, 1989;Markman, 1989). And yet, as should be expected when drawing uncertain inferences from minimal data, much of the time the initial inferences that we make are wrong. We infer that the earth is flat, that the sun orbits the earth, that invisible entities determine everyday events, that moving objects have a hidden force inside them.Given that the evidence available to us is insufficient to ensure accuracy, and frequently leads to incorrect conclusions and common misconceptions, the capacity to revise our initial inferences based on of new and conflicting evidence is critical to constructing a coherent understanding of the world. And though this is undoubtedly true throughout the lifespan, it is especially true for children forming the initial causal theories that will frame their subsequent learning. Even very young children are sensitive to surprising or unexpected evidence, at least when it presents a clear conflict (Legare, 2012;Stahl & Feigenson, 2015). But relevant counterevidence may often be subtle and easily overlooked unless there is reason to think it might be particularly important. In making inferences, children use others as a source of knowledge to help guide inductive inferences in the face of uncertainty and to gauge the importance of new information. The current research aims to bring this work to bear on the critical process of hypothesis revision in the face of counterevidence. We asked whether children Pedagogy and counterevidence 4 might be more likely to make use of counterevidence in revising their initial hypotheses, when...