Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts

Guesnerie, Roger; Jara‐Moroni, Pedro

doi:10.1007/s00199-010-0556-8

Cited by 23 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Since they are subsets of R, P S ⊆ R S must both be intervals. The hypotheses of Proposition 4.3 imply that the upper and lower bounds of R S are in fact point-rationalizable (Guesnerie and Jara-Moroni, 2011), which gives the converse inclusion. 2…”

Section: ))mentioning

confidence: 83%

“…In general games with strategic complements or substitutes (that is, dropping the assumption that the actions are unidimensional) it is still possible to have P S = R S . This is the case when P S is an interval (see Guesnerie and Jara-Moroni, 2011). 29…”

Section: ))mentioning

confidence: 97%

“…It is crucial to obtain reduction procedures from rationalizable to point-rationalizable sets (see Section 4) and simpler iterative procedures as well (Guesnerie and Jara-Moroni, 2011). Moreover, we know that the convex hull of the set of equilibria is also contained in the set of point-rationalizable states and this inclusion may be strict.…”

Section: Proposition 36 In a Game U If X ⊆ S Is Nonempty And Closementioning

confidence: 99%

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Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players

Jara‐Moroni¹

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

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The concept of rationalizability has been used in the last fifteen years to study stability of equilibria in models with a continuum of agents such as competitive markets, macroeconomic dynamics and currency attacks. However, rationalizability has been formally defined in general settings only for games with a finite number of players. We propose an exploration of rationalizability in the context of games with a continuum of players. We deal with a special class of these games, in which payoff of each player depends only on his own strategy and on an aggregate value: the state of the game, which is obtained from the complete action profile. We define the sets of point-rationalizable states and rationalizable states. For the case of continuous payoffs and compact strategy sets, we characterize these sets and prove their convexity and compactness. We provide as well results on the equivalence of point-and standard-rationalizability.

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Section: ))mentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: ))mentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Proposition 36 In a Game U If X ⊆ S Is Nonempty And Closementioning

confidence: 99%

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Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players

Jara‐Moroni¹

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…In particular, the externality in the game cannot be summarized by an aggregate of actions of players as in Acemoglu and Jensen (2013), as each player's payoff does depend on average distance to their neighbors, rather then distance to the average neighbor. Moreover, since the set of probability distributions is not a lattice, the externality in the game cannot be formulated as a "lattice externality" (see Guesnerie and Jara-Moroni 2011).…”

Section: Social Distance Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 In a separate, yet related set of papers, researchers have turned their attention to the question of the existence of equilibrium comparative statics in large games with strategic complementarities (henceforth LGSC) between player actions or "traits" [e.g., see Guesnerie and Jara-Moroni (2011) or Jensen (2010, 2013)]. The latter strand of work focused primarily on non-atomic, aggregative games, in which payoffs of individual players were affected by an aggregate of actions of other players in the game (or a vector of aggregates).…”

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A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities

et al. 2017

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We study the existence and computation of equilibrium in large games with strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators defined on the space of distributions partially ordered with respect to the first-order stochastic dominance, we prove existence of a greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium. In particular, we obtain our results under a different set of conditions than those in the existing literature. Moreover, we provide computable monotone distributional equilibrium comparative statics with respect to the parameters of the game. Finally, we apply our results to models of social distance, large stopping games, keeping up with the Joneses, as well as a general class of linear non-atomic games.

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Monetary policy and heterogeneous expectations

Branch

Evans

2010

Econ Theory

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This paper studies the implications for monetary policy of heterogeneous expectations in a New Keynesian model. The assumption of rational expectations is replaced with parsimonious forecasting models where agents select between predictors that are underparameterized. In a Misspecification Equilibrium agents only select the best-performing statistical models. We demonstrate that, even when monetary policy rules satisfy the Taylor principle by adjusting nominal interest rates more than one for one with inflation, there may exist equilibria with Intrinsic Heterogeneity. Under certain conditions, there may exist multiple misspecification equilibria. We show that these findings have important implications for business cycle dynamics and for the design of monetary policy.

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Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts

Abstract: Expectational coordination, Rational expectations, Iterative expectational stability, Eductive stability, Strong rationality, Strategic complementarities, Strategic substitutabilities, D84, C72, C62,

Cited by 23 publications

References 36 publications

Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players

Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players

A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities

Monetary policy and heterogeneous expectations

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