Experience in Designing for Cyber Resiliency in Embedded DoD Systems

Abstract

In DoD systems, software component reuse is highly valued, and development is rarely started from scratch. Most embedded weapon systems are a heterogeneous mixture of new, modified, and legacy components. This mixture drives an increased impetus to improve upon the existing system's model, and also creates an opportunity to assess potential cyber vulnerabilities earlier in the lifecycle. In this paper, we describe our experience in developing an experimental platform, which is a representative testbed that incorporates legacy, modified, and new components, using a process where we address cyber resiliency early in development. We give accounts of where each of the parts of our representative testbed originated, what modeling decisions we made, and how we analyzed cyber vulnerabilities. We also propose a system engineering process, based on architectural modeling of the system, which introduces analysis early in the design for cyber resiliency. We are developing an approach to use advanced tools to find vulnerabilities and to develop cyber resiliency requirements to counter those vulnerabilities. The creation of the model and documentation of cyber resiliency requirements and design decisions provide a positive impact on the system lifecycle and future integration of the system.

Attack-Defense Tree-based Security Analysis and Optimal Defense Synthesis for System Design

“…If the delivery site is free of obstacles and a confirmation message for a high-valued item is received from the operator, then the Delivery Planner activates the Delivery Item Mechanism to drop off the package. In addition to being used for analyzing the delivery drone model, the VERDICT toolchain was leveraged by Raytheon Technologies, to evaluate on DoD application development showing promising results [18], and to perform security analysis in additive manufacturing systems [19].…”