Experience of and in Time

Phillips, Ian

doi:10.1111/phc3.12107

Cited by 47 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…For some philosophers (Hoerl, 2013;Phillips, 2014;Soteriou, 2010), the answer to the first question is negative: the order of our experiences mirrors or inherits the temporal structure of the environment. Thus, to experience event A happening before B, we must perceive that particular temporal order, even if it is illusory, such as when a thunder is seen before it is heard.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Time reordered: Causal perception guides the interpretation of temporal order

Bechlivanidis¹,

Lagnado²

2016

Cognition

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We present a novel temporal illusion in which the perceived order of events is dictated by their perceived causal relationship. Participants view a simple Michotte-style launching sequence featuring 3 objects, in which one object starts moving before its presumed cause. Not only did participants re-order the events in a causally consistent way, thus violating the objective temporal order, but they also failed to recognise the clip they had seen, preferring a clip in which temporal and causal order matched. We show that the effect is not due to lack of attention to the presented events and we discuss the problem of determining whether causality affects temporal order at an early perceptual stage or whether it distorts an accurately perceived order during retrieval. Alternatively, we propose a mechanism by which temporal order is neither misperceived nor misremembered but inferred "on-demand" given phenomenal causality and the temporal priority principle, the assumption that causes precede their effects. Finally, we discuss how, contrary to theories of causal perception, impressions of causality can be generated from dynamic sequences with strong spatiotemporal deviations.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Time reordered: Causal perception guides the interpretation of temporal order

Bechlivanidis¹,

Lagnado²

2016

Cognition

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“…There are various other sensory modalities with which we experience time, such as sound and touch, that we will not consider. See Phillips (2014) for a recent survey piece that covers cross-modal temporal experience.…”

Section: What Is the Problem Of Temporal Qualia?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… See Paul (2010),Norton (2010),Prosser (2012Prosser ( , 2013Prosser ( , 2016,Hoerl (2014),Phillips (2014), andBaron et al (2015).European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 8…”

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confidence: 99%

Explaining temporal qualia

Farr

2020

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a 'flow-like' quality. Call this 'temporal qualia'. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims and make the case that passage-talk plays no useful explanatory role with respect to temporal qualia, but rather obfuscates what the philosophical problem of temporal qualia is. I offer a 'reductionist' account of temporal qualia that makes no reference to the concept of passage and argue that it is well motivated by empirical studies in motion perception.

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“…I defend an account of temporal phenomenology that is compatible with the B-theory in Torrengo (2017a). 4 Deng (2013), Phillips (2014), and Hoerl (2014) also focus on the "folk" explanation of temporal experience rather than on its (alleged) specific phenomenal character. None of them seem to consider such a closeness to common sense to be a theoretical advantage of the A-theoryalthough each for a different reason.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Hyper-Russellian Skepticism

Torrengo

2017

Metaphysica

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The hyper-Russellian skeptic is someone who thinks that only one of all your experiences was, is, and will ever be conscious. Which one? The very one you are having now. Before you were always a zombie, and you will be a zombie for ever after. In the present literature on the metaphysics of passage of time, there is disagreement on whether our feeling that time passes — the “dynamic flavor” of our ordinary experience — provides support to the A-theory, that is, the thesis that the passage of time is an objective feature of reality. Lately, several philosophers have argued against this idea. In this paper I want to push this line of reasoning further by exploiting the hyper-Russellian scenario against the A-theory of time.

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Experience of and in Time

Cited by 47 publications

References 64 publications

Time reordered: Causal perception guides the interpretation of temporal order

Time reordered: Causal perception guides the interpretation of temporal order

Explaining temporal qualia

Hyper-Russellian Skepticism

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