Experimental Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution with a Sub-Poissionian Heralded Single-Photon Source

Wang, Qin; Chen, Wei; Xavier, G. B.; Świłło, Marcin; Zhang, Tao; Sauge, Sébastien; Tengner, Maria; Han, Zheng‐Fu; Guo, Guang‐Can; Karlsson, Anders

doi:10.1103/physrevlett.100.090501

Cited by 131 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 35 publications

(25 reference statements)

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“…It is important for not only weak coherent pulse-based protocols, but also, for instance, parametric down-conversion-based protocols [35]. And continuous or discrete phase randomization is also crucial for the loss-tolerant protocol [24].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography

Sun

Jiang

et al. 2015

Phys. Rev. A

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The security of source has become an increasingly important issue in quantum cryptography. Based on the framework of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), the source becomes the only region exploitable by a potential eavesdropper (Eve). Phase randomization is a cornerstone assumption in most discrete-variable (DV) quantum communication protocols (e.g., QKD, quantum coin tossing, weakcoherent-state blind quantum computing, and so on), and the violation of such an assumption is thus fatal to the security of those protocols. In this paper, we show a simple quantum hacking strategy, with commercial and homemade pulsed lasers, by Eve that allows her to actively tamper with the source and violate such an assumption, without leaving a trace afterwards. Furthermore, our attack may also be valid for continuous-variable (CV) QKD, which is another main class of QKD protocol, since, excepting the phase random assumption, other parameters (e.g., intensity) could also be changed, which directly determine the security of CV-QKD.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography

Sun

Jiang

et al. 2015

Phys. Rev. A

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“…However, there always exist conflicts between the attacks B Qin Wang qinw@njupt.edu.cn 1 and anti-attacks during the development of QKD, which is mainly due to tension between ideal assumptions in the security proofs and imperfect realistic setups [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15]. To reconcile these, different protocols and methods have been introduced, such as the decoy-state method [16][17][18][19][20][21], the device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD) [22][23][24][25][26] and the measurement device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) [27,28]. Among them, MDI-QKD seems most promising.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An enhanced proposal on decoy-state measurement device-independent quantum key distribution

Wang

Zhang

Luo

et al. 2016

Quantum Inf Process

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By employing pulses involving three-intensity, we propose a scheme for the measurement device-independent quantum key distribution with heralded singlephoton sources. We make a comparative study of this scheme with the standard threeintensity decoy-state scheme using weak coherent sources or heralded single-photon sources. The advantage of this scheme is illustrated through numerical simulations: It can approach very closely the asymptotic case of using an infinite number of decoystates and exhibits excellent behavior in both the secure transmission distance and the final key generation rate.

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“…Then a malicious eavesdropper, Eve, who might own the most advance computational power and technology, can carry out corresponding attacks by making use of the loopholes due to imperfections [4][5][6][7][8][9][10]. In order to countermeasure the so-called photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [4][5][6], the decoy-state method was created [11][12][13][14][15][16]. Moreover, the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) [17,18] has been invented to defeat the more powerful sidechannel attacks [7][8][9][10].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The enhanced measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with two-intensity decoy states

Zhu

Zhou

et al. 2016

Quantum Inf Process

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We put forward a new scheme for implementing the measurement-deviceindependent quantum key distribution (QKD) with weak coherent source, while using only two different intensities. In the new scheme, we insert a beam splitter and a local detector at both Alice's and Bob's side, and then all the triggering and nontriggering signals could be employed to process parameter estimations, resulting in very precise estimations for the two-single-photon contributions. Besides, we compare its behavior with two other often used methods, i.e., the conventional standard three-intensity decoy-state measurement-device-independent QKD and the passive measurement-device-independent QKD. Through numerical simulations, we demonstrate that our new approach can exhibit outstanding characteristics not only in the secure transmission distance, but also in the final key generation rate.

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Experimental Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution with a Sub-Poissionian Heralded Single-Photon Source

Cited by 131 publications

References 35 publications

Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography

Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography

An enhanced proposal on decoy-state measurement device-independent quantum key distribution

The enhanced measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with two-intensity decoy states

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