2006
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-005-3792-9
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Experimental Evidence on Alternative Environmental Valuation Methods

Abstract: Experimental methods are central to assessments of environmental valuation approaches that are operationally meaningful. Existing lab experiments focus attention sharply on the neglect of hypothetical bias. They also offer constructive solutions to correct this bias, and beg for validation in field experiments. Copyright Springer 2006experiments, valuation, hypothetical bias,

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Cited by 172 publications
(75 citation statements)
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“…After arrival of the participants, subjects were informed that they would receive €10 participation fee at the end of the session. After subjects consented to participate in the auction, they were assigned an ID number and received the experimental instructions together with 1 However, some researchers have cautioned that repeated exposure of subjects to market price might cause their bids to become affiliated, which could then cause the incentive compatibility property of the auction mechanism to break down Harrison, 2006). These researchers are in favor of one-shot institutions rather than repeated ones.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…After arrival of the participants, subjects were informed that they would receive €10 participation fee at the end of the session. After subjects consented to participate in the auction, they were assigned an ID number and received the experimental instructions together with 1 However, some researchers have cautioned that repeated exposure of subjects to market price might cause their bids to become affiliated, which could then cause the incentive compatibility property of the auction mechanism to break down Harrison, 2006). These researchers are in favor of one-shot institutions rather than repeated ones.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As it stands, however, there seems to be two camps of researchers that have different views about the issue of use of repeated trials/rounds in experimental auctions. One camp includes researchers like Harrison (2006) and Corrigan and Rousu (2006) who argue in favour of one-shot institutions rather than repeated institutions. Another camp would include researchers like Lusk and Shogren (Lusk andShogren 2007, Shogren 2006) who tend to be supportive of repeated trials in auctions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another camp would include researchers like Lusk and Shogren (Lusk andShogren 2007, Shogren 2006) who tend to be supportive of repeated trials in auctions. Harrison (2006) and Harrison et al (2004) make the argument that posted prices can signal either the extra-experimental market price of the commodity (or a field substitute) or the quality of the commodity which would cause people's bids to become inter-dependent. Lusk and Shogren (2007) test the argument about the signal of quality by examining the bids for different qualities of beef steaks in a five-round second-price auction.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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